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INTRODUCTION 
However history ultimately judges Edward Snowden, his 2013 rev-
elations regarding secret bulk collection of domestic phone records 
by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) eroded many Americans’ 
trust in their government, as well as their confidence in the privacy of 
their electronic conversations.1  Americans were shocked and an-
gered to learn that their government had been collecting all kinds of 
information about their communications, without serious judicial su-
pervision and when most or all of the data was domestic.  Fears that 
America had turned into a surveillance state fueled sales of encryp-
tion technology2 and were reflected in both the media and popular 
culture.3 
 
 1 See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden 
Era, 23–25 (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/ files/2014/11/PI_Public
PerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf [hereinafter Pew 2014 Study] (finding that, with respect 
to landline phones, cell phones, text messaging, instant messaging, email, and social me-
dia messaging, “there is not one mode through which a majority of the American public 
feels ‘very secure’ sharing private information with another trusted person or organiza-
tion”). 
 2 See e.g., Bill Flook, There’s No Business Like Snowden Business, WASH. BUS. J. (July 25, 2014), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/print-edition/2014/07/25/ theres-no-business-
 like-snowden-business.html?page=all (describing how consumer interest in encryption 
technology increased following the Snowden disclosures). 
 3 Journalists covering the Snowden revelations inevitably invoked George Orwell.  See PEN 
Surveillance Mapping Metaphor Project, PEN American Ctr., http://www. pen.org/
infographic/pen-surveillance-metaphor-mapping-project (illustrating that Orwell’s novel 
1984 was the only literary work referred to in the PEN America survey). 
   Government surveillance also inspired art exhibits, songs, and even a popular Holly-
wood children’s movie.  See, e.g., Peter Maass, Art in a Time of Surveillance, First Look, THE 
INTERCEPT, Nov. 13, 2014, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/13/art-
surveillance-explored-artists; John Hanlon, Why The LEGO Movie is the new Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, THE WEEK, Feb. 7, 2014, http://theweek.com/article/index/256154/why-
the-lego-movie-is-the-new-nineteen-eighty-four (comparing the influence of government 
surveillance in Orwell’s 1984 and The LEGO Movie); Rock, Paper, Cynic, Hello NSA (A Love 
Song of Mass Surveillance), YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Eiu-7Ij6CWI. 
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After two years of public debate and political grandstanding, Con-
gress finally enacted the USA FREEDOM Act,4 and news reports 
trumpeted the end of government bulk collection of American tele-
phone records.5  No longer could the government use Section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act6 to force telecommunications providers to de-
liver to the NSA, on a daily basis, the “metadata”—transmittal infor-
mation including the numbers dialed, time, date, and duration7—
associated with most Americans’ phone calls.8  Both President Barack 
Obama and Edward Snowden applauded the passage of the new law,9 
the latter calling it “a historic victory for the rights of every citizen.”10  
 
 4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, 
Dragnet-Collection, and Online Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 
268, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2015) [hereinafter Freedom Act]. 
 5 See, e.g., David Cole, Reining in the NSA, N.Y. TIMES REV. OF BOOKS (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/jun/02/nsa-surveillance-congress-sunset; 
Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindication for Snowden, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/ jun/02/
congress-surveillance-reform-edward-snowden. 
 6 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scat-
tered titles of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].  Section 215 of the Patriot Act 
amended the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 
and 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FISA].  The business records provision authorizes the FBI Di-
rector or a designee to seek: 
an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, rec-
ords, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain intelli-
gence information not concerning a United States  person or to protect against in-
ternational terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such 
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. 
  Patriot Act, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a).  The application for such author-
ity need only “specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investiga-
tion . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person 
or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”  Id., 
codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2). 
 7 See David Medine et al., Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 
of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Pri-
vacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd. 8 (2014), https://www.pclob. gov/library/215-
Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB Section 215 Re-
port] (defining “metadata” for phone calls and emails). 
 8 To be more precise, the Freedom Act authorized the government to restart the former 
Section 215 program and operate it for six months while the NSA and the telecommuni-
cations providers transition to the new, Freedom Act system.  Freedom Act, supra note 4, 
at § 109(a). 
 9 See Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 is Sharply 
Limited, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2015, at A1 (noting that “Mr. Obama was quick to praise pas-
sage of the legislation and to scold those who opposed it”). 
 10 Edward J. Snowden, Edward Snowden:  The World Says No to Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 
2015, at A27. 
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Politicians and professors labeled the Freedom Act the most signifi-
cant surveillance reform in decades, describing it as a reflection of 
the popular belief that the government has no business spying on 
Americans’ calls.11  Some went so far as to give credit to Snowden for 
launching a debate that led to legislative reform, resulting in a para-
digmatic example of the democratic process at work.12 
In fact, however, these laudatory remarks overstate what the Free-
dom Act actually accomplished.  While the new law imposes some 
limits on the government’s ability to gather Americans’ domestic 
communications records under the Patriot Act, the Freedom Act 
leaves untouched the government’s power to collect most (if not all) 
of these same records under other legal authorities.  These other laws 
include Executive Order (“EO 12333”),13 issued by President Ronald 
Reagan in 1981, which sets out an expansive framework under which 
the nation’s intelligence agencies engage in surveillance activities 
conducted outside U.S. borders without judicial involvement or 
meaningful congressional oversight.14  Although Title VII of the For-
 
 11 See, e.g., Erin Kelly, Senate Approves USA Freedom Act, USA TODAY (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/02/patriot-act-usa-freedom-act-
senate-vote/28345747 (“Americans are no longer willing to give the intelligence agencies 
a blank check.”); Peter Swire, The USA FREEDOM Act, the President’s Review Group and the 
Biggest Intelligence Reform in 40 Years, PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (June 8, 2015), 
https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-usa-freedom-act-the-presidents-review-group-
and-the-biggest-intelligence-reform-in-40-years/ (calling the USA FREEDOM Act the 
“biggest pro-privacy change to U.S. intelligence law since the original enactment of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978”). 
 12 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 5; Jessica Shulberg, The Elephant in the Room:  Senators Finally Cred-
it Snowden For Role in Patriot Act Reforms, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/01/snowden-nsa-patriot-act_n_7485702.html. 
 13 Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 13284, 3 
C.F.R. 161 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13355, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2004); and Exec. Order No. 
13470, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2008) [hereinafter EO 12333].  EO 12333 explains that, under its 
auspices, “[a]ll means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full 
consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable intel-
ligence information to protect the United States and its interests.”  Id. §1.1(a).  Its provi-
sions are implemented by individual intelligence agencies pursuant to guidelines that 
must be approved by the Attorney General.  Id. § 3.2. 
   The full text of EO 12333, as amended, is available online.  See, e.g., EO 12333, 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf. 
 14 See Nat’l Sec. Agency, Memorandum:  The National Security Agency:  Missions, Authori-
ties, Oversight and Partnerships, 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nsa.gov/ pub-
lic_info/_files/speeches_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_story.pdf [hereinafter NSA 
Memorandum] (stating that EO 12333 applies when surveillance is “conducted through 
various means around the globe, largely from outside the United States, which is not oth-
erwise regulated by FISA”). 
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eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”)15 forbids the gov-
ernment from intentionally targeting a U.S. person’s foreign com-
munications without a FISA warrant,16 bulk collection of communica-
tions from abroad is regarded by the NSA as not targeting anyone.17  
These large-scale collections under EO 12333 cannot avoid “inci-
dentally” harvesting sizeable quantities of U.S. person communica-
tions, including, for example, both content and metadata of calls 
made by Americans to or from a foreign country, or even purely do-
mestic communications that travel over international cables or are 
stored on backup servers located in foreign countries.18  For this rea-
son, EO 12333 has been described as a legal loophole by which the 
NSA can avoid complying with FISA or the Fourth Amendment even 
as the agency intercepts communications belonging to Americans.19  
Although by passing the Freedom Act, Congress has showed itself 
willing to make changes to the surveillance state, the surveillers have 
yet to be reined in. 
All government surveillance programs create communications 
privacy concerns, whether the snooping consists of a government 
agent opening a sealed letter, wiretapping a telephone, pretending to 
be a criminal suspect’s trusted friend, or collecting and analyzing 
communications metadata.  When we communicate with others, both 
the right to privacy and the right of free expression are put in play.  
Communications privacy promotes both individual and societal val-
ues; it enables us to engage in meaningful social interactions that are 
essential to both the creation of intimate personal relationships and 
the maintenance of a flourishing political system.  Logically, then, it 
would follow that in America we ought to accord significant constitu-
tional protection, based on both the Fourth and First Amendments, 
to the privacy of our communications. 
Generally, however, questions regarding the ability of speakers to 
exclude the “uninvited ear”20 of the government from our communi-
cations have been treated by courts as governed entirely by the 
Fourth Amendment, not the First.  If the surveillance in question 
qualifies as a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, any 
First Amendment implications are adequately addressed, according 
 
 15 Title VII was added to the original FISA in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
110-161, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008). 
 16 FISA, supra note 6, at § 1881c(a)(2). 
 17 See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text. 
 20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
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to the Court, if the government obtains a warrant.21  If the surveil-
lance does not rise to the level of a search or seizure because the gov-
ernment collects only non-content communications metadata that 
the speaker shared with a third party, not even a warrant is required.22 
Nevertheless, scholars have repeatedly called for recognition of a 
First Amendment right to be free from government surveillance, 
whether because it interferes with the freedom of thought necessary 
for what Professor Neil Richards has termed “intellectual privacy,”23 
or, because as Professor Katherine Strandburg has argued, surveil-
lance that reveals citizens’ organizational ties violates freedom of as-
sociation.24  So far, these arguments have failed to gain much trac-
tion.  Declassified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC” or 
“FISA court”) opinions that authorized bulk collection of communi-
cations metadata under FISA either rejected any First Amendment 
objections or failed to mention them at all.25  While several lawsuits 
challenging surveillance programs have raised First Amendment 
claims, those arguments either did not prevail or were not addressed 
by courts.26 
My central theme is that the First Amendment should be consid-
ered in partnership with the Fourth so that both play a role in deter-
mining the constitutionality of bulk government surveillance of our 
communications.  Given the development of the law and the con-
straints of precedent, neither Amendment will, on its own, provide 
 
 21 See infra notes 324–29 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 141–49, 181–86 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013). 
 24 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s Specifici-
ty Requirement, 10 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327, 332 (2014). 
 25 See, e.g., Opinion and Order, [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted] at 66-69 (FISA Ct. [Re-
dacted] 2004) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 836336-
 cleanedprtt-1.html [hereinafter Kollar-Kotelly Opinion] (holding that NSA bulk collec-
tion of email and Internet metadata under Section 214 of the Patriot Act did not violate 
the First Amendment); Amended Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things 
From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (Eagan, J.), http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf [hereinafter Eagan 
opinion] (upholding Section 215 program under the Fourth Amendment with no men-
tion of the First Amendment). 
 26 See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (deciding the cases with-
out reaching the First Amendment issue); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-
KI-1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *30–38 (D. Ore. June 24, 2014) (holding that sur-
veillance under Section 702 of FISA did not violate the First Amendment because the 
Fourth Amendment was satisfied); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9–10 n.7 
(D.D.C. 2013) (enjoining operation of Section 215 program on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, without reaching the First Amendment claim), rev’d, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
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sufficient protection against the government with respect to commu-
nications privacy.  My specific focus here is on government collection 
and analysis of communications metadata under EO 12333.27  While 
the Freedom Act represents a small step by Congress to improve our 
communications privacy, it did nothing to resolve the great constitu-
tional metadata debate.  It leaves intact the government’s over-
arching legal theory that when the NSA collects communications 
metadata and uses it to map out our contacts and social networks 
(what the NSA calls “contact chaining”28), the agency resides in a 
Constitution-free zone. 29 
In Part I, I give a brief overview of the Freedom Act, and contrast 
it with what we know about the government’s ability incidentally to 
collect domestic communications pursuant to EO 12333.  While the 
Freedom Act places some restraints on the NSA’s ability to hold and 
analyze domestic metadata, most of the public remains unaware that 
EO 12333 provides an alternate authority for the NSA to engage in 
many of the same activities while bypassing any statutory or constitu-
tional limitations. 
In Part II, I describe how communications privacy developed un-
der the Fourth rather than the First Amendment.  I show how the 
Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test from the electronic 
eavesdropping cases, combined with the assumption of the risk con-
cept developed in the false friend cases evolved into the notorious 
third party doctrine.  This much-criticized legal principle forms the 
basis for the government’s constitutional argument justifying bulk 
 
 27 This is not to discount the importance of the First and Fourth Amendments with respect 
to government collection of communication content.  However, when the government 
collects communications content under FISA or, to a more limited extent, under EO 
12333, certain minimization requirements apply that limit the acquisition, retention, and 
dissemination of non-publicly available U.S. person information. See infra notes 91–93 and 
accompanying text.  Whether those protections adequately safeguard First and Fourth 
Amendment interests is a topic for another day; for present purposes, I note that minimi-
zation procedures regarding the analysis of communications metadata collected under 
EO 12333 are much less robust.  See infra notes 94–109 and accompanying text. 
   For a comprehensive analysis of the statutory and constitutional issues regarding in-
ternational collection of communications content under FISA, see generally Laura K. 
Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015). 
 28 See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 26–31 (explaining the contact chaining 
process in the context of the former Section 215 telephony metadata program). 
 29 See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER:  BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 19–22 (2013), https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-
NSABulkCollection.pdf [hereinafter ADMIN. WHITE PAPER] (defending former Section 
215 telephony metadata program as constitutional under both the Fourth and First 
Amendments). 
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collection and analysis of domestic metadata in general, and under 
EO 12333 in particular.30  Although commentators have made strong 
and thoughtful arguments as to why the third party doctrine should 
be jettisoned as a relic of a bygone era,31 whether the Supreme Court 
is ready to do so remains uncertain. 
Part III explains why stand-alone First Amendment challenges to 
bulk government collection of communications metadata are also un-
likely to succeed.  Government monitoring of our communications 
activity, including gathering and analyzing communications metada-
ta, would logically seem to inhibit speech.  However, chilling effects 
by themselves are not a sufficient injury to support a First Amend-
ment claim, and government surveillance programs neither prohibit 
nor punish speech.32  Associational privacy claims provide a somewhat 
stronger argument, but without evidence of retaliation or other nega-
tive effects, they are also likely to fail.33  As a result, even massive sur-
veillance programs that collect and analyze communications metada-
ta belonging to U.S. persons, such as the little-known EO 12333, are 
unlikely to be struck down as violations of the First Amendment. 
In Part IV, I describe how the Supreme Court has, nevertheless, 
recognized the salience of First Amendment values when the gov-
ernment interferes with our communications privacy.  In particular, I 
focus on United States v. U.S. District Court (the “Keith” case),34 where 
the Court indicated that when the government captures communica-
tions content in national security cases, the First Amendment should 
be read in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment to provide par-
ties to those communications with heightened privacy protections.35  
This, I believe, will provide a path for the Court to reevaluate and 
limit the third party doctrine with respect to dragnet government col-
lection of communications metadata without overruling the doctrine 
entirely.  By determining that communications metadata associated 
with U.S. person communications that the NSA happens to capture 
abroad—whether because an American called a person in a foreign 
country, or because a wholly domestic communication traveled 
through a transoceanic cable—are relevant to foreign intelligence in-
vestigations such that they can be captured and contact-chained 
without limit, the government has engaged in an end-run around 
 
 30 See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 241–61 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 262–79 and accompanying text. 
 34 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 35 Id. at 313–14. 
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Keith’s holding that it must procure a warrant to engage in electronic 
surveillance of  U.S. citizens with “no significant connection with a 
foreign power, its agents or agencies.”36 
Whether a constitutional challenge to bulk incidental collection 
of domestic metadata under EO 12333 will ever be heard by the Su-
preme Court is another matter.  Standing doctrine as currently ap-
plied by the Court has prohibited constitutional review of surveillance 
programs where the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their commu-
nications were, in fact, gathered or scrutinized by the government.37  
Many have argued that in the context of massive government surveil-
lance programs, the Court should loosen standing requirements and 
recognize a broader range of harms to ensure that those programs do 
not escape judicial review.38  Given the serious implications that un-
checked executive branch surveillance power presents to privacy, 
speech, and our democratic process, this would be a welcome devel-
opment. Courts must abandon overly narrow views of standing that 
make it impossible to challenge clear violations of law. 
In the meantime, however, I conclude by calling for both Con-
gress and the executive branch to act to bring the NSA’s incidental 
collection of domestic communications metadata under EO 12333 
more in line with the Fourth and First Amendments.  As a start, both 
Congress and the public need as much information as national secu-
rity permits regarding the scope and efficacy of those collection ef-
forts.  Additionally, I sketch out further congressional and executive 
branch reforms that would provide meaningful privacy protections to 
American communication records that the government currently can 
harvest from abroad.  If enacted, these reforms would help create a 
world in which we need not fear that the government collects, analyz-
es, and stores the records of our everyday communications simply be-
cause, thanks to technology, those records can be obtained from for-
eign sources. 
 
 36 Id. at 309 n.8. 
 37 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).  See infra notes 280–307 and 
accompanying text. 
 38 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 23, at 1963 (proposing that the Supreme Court should rec-
ognize surveillance of intellectual activities as a harm in standing doctrine); Christopher 
Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2015) (urging 
that the Court treat challenges to government surveillance as presenting cognizable 
claims under political process theory). 
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I.  UNDERSTANDING THE USA FREEDOM ACT AND  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 
In June 2013, Edward Snowden made worldwide headlines when 
he revealed that the NSA had implemented sweeping surveillance of 
Americans under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.39  That month, The 
Guardian published a top secret order from the FISC directing a ma-
jor U.S. telephone company to turn over to the NSA, on a daily basis, 
millions of its customers’ call records.40  The order, leaked by Snow-
den, compelled Verizon to deliver to the NSA the telephony metada-
ta relating to all domestic calls, as well as all calls with one end in the 
United States, for a three-month period.41  Within weeks, the gov-
ernment was forced to admit not only the program’s continued exist-
ence, but also that it been first approved by the FISC in 2006, that 
similar FISC orders had been issued to other major American tele-
communications providers, and that those orders had been continu-
ally reauthorized.42  The result was instant notoriety for Snowden, 
shock and disbelief on the part of many Americans, and the standard 
invocation of terrorism prevention as a justification by the Obama 
Administration.43  Metadata, once a term familiar only to information 
technologists and data analysts, entered the standard American vo-
cabulary. 
Following the Snowden disclosures, Congress seemed eager to 
pass legislation to curb the NSA’s ability to spy on Americans; more 
than twenty bills were introduced for the purpose of limiting NSA 
surveillance powers.44  It took until June 2015, however, for the Free-
dom Act to become law—two days after Section 215 technically had 
 
 39 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
 40 The Guardian published the full text of the FISC order.  See Verizon Forced to Turn Over Tele-
phone Data—Full Court Ruling, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com
/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Letter from James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Sen. Ron Wyden, 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=285dc9e7-195a-4467-b0fe-
caa857fc4e0d&download=1; ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 2. 
 43 ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that telephony metadata collection pro-
gram was designed to “close critical intelligence gaps that were highlighted by the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks.”). 
 44 Ryan Gallagher, U.S. Lawmakers Launch Assault on NSA Domestic Snooping, SLATE (Oct. 29, 
2013), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/29/sensenbrenner_and_ leahy_s_us
a_freedom_act_seeks_to_curb_nsa_domestic_spying.html. 
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expired.45  In this Part, I briefly outline the provisions of the Freedom 
Act, and contrast them with what we know about government’s ability 
to collect and analyze communications metadata under EO 12333. 
A.  The USA Freedom Act 
Of the various surveillance bills introduced in Congress, the origi-
nal 2013 version of the Freedom Act was considered to be among the 
most comprehensive.46  However, by the end of 2014, the House had 
significantly weakened the bill’s privacy protections, and the bill 
stalled in the Senate.47  In April 2015, with Section 215’s May 31 sun-
set date looming, legislators introduced a revised version of the Free-
dom Act in the House and Senate judiciary committees.48  Despite 
fervent opposition by both reformers and surveillance hawks in the 
Senate, this version ultimately won congressional approval and was 
signed by the President.49 
Effective 180 days after its enactment, the Freedom Act forbids the 
government from indiscriminately collecting telephony metadata in 
bulk under Section 215.50  As of November 29, 2015, the Freedom Act 
established a new framework under which call detail records will re-
main with the telecommunications companies.51  If the government 
can demonstrate a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a “specific 
selection term”—i.e. a person’s name or account number—is associ-
ated with international terrorism, the FISC may issue an order requir-
 
 45 When the Senate in a rare Sunday session failed to reauthorize or reform Section 215 
before its sunset date, intelligence officials said they shut the telephony metadata pro-
gram down for the first time in fourteen years.  See Lisa Mascaro, NSA Bulk Collection of 
Phone Data Stops; Senate Fails to Act Before Deadline, L.A. TIMES (May 31, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-na-senate-nsa-20150531-
story.html#page=1.  The Freedom Act restored the government’s ability to operate the 
former Section 215 program for six months while the government and telecommunica-
tions providers transition to the new system.  Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 109(a). 
 46 See Gallagher, supra note 44. 
 47 Charlie Savage & Jeremy W. Peters, Move to Restrict Data Collection Blocked G.O.P., N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at A1, A15. 
 48 Spencer Ackerman, NSA Reform Bill Imperilled as it Competes with Alternative Effort in the Sen-
ate, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
apr/ 28/house-nsa-reform-bill-senate-usa-freedom-act. 
 49 Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is Sharply 
Limited, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2015, at A1. 
 50 Freedom Act, supra note 4, at §§ 103, 109(a). 
 51 For a discussion of whether having the private sector keep domestic telephony metadata 
reduces or increases the risks to individual privacy, see David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy 
Trade-Offs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“[K]eeping the metadata with the pri-
vate sector or with some newly created entity might merely shift the locus and expand the 
scope of the privacy threat, at least if the implementing rules are not well designed.”). 
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ing the phone companies to produce, on an ongoing, daily basis, call 
records within two degrees of separation from the selection term.52  
(The first “hop” worth of call records includes all calls made by or to 
the suspect number.  A second “hop” would provide the NSA with 
records of all calls made or received by each number identified in the 
first “hop.”)  Ongoing production orders are limited to 180 days, alt-
hough, as before, those orders can be extended with FISC approval.53  
Additionally, the Freedom Act requires the government to promptly 
destroy all call detail records determined to be irrelevant to foreign 
intelligence,54 and allows FISC judges to impose additional minimiza-
tion procedures to protect nonpublic information concerning U.S. 
persons.55 
Under Title II of the Freedom Act, the government is foreclosed 
from using the pen register/trap and trace provisions of the Patriot 
Act56 as an alternate means to implement bulk metadata collection.  
Section 201 of the Freedom Act provides that the government may 
only apply for a pen register or trap and trace device on the basis of a 
“specific selection term,” which is defined to exclude broad terms 
such as zip codes, or the names of cities or computing services.57  This 
provision is particularly important because the NSA relied on the Pa-
triot Act pen register/trap and trace provisions as authority to collect 
a huge amount of domestic email metadata from 2004 to 2011.58  Ti-
tle V of the Freedom Act limits the national security letter program in 
the same fashion, prohibiting the government from obtaining a na-
tional security letter59 except upon application based on a specific 
identifier.60 
 
 52 Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 101. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at § 104(a)(3). 
 56 Id. at §§ 201–02.  In the pre-Patriot Act era, a pen register was a device that recorded the 
numbers dialed from a particular phone, and a trap and trace device recorded the num-
bers of incoming calls received by a particular phone.  The Patriot Act amended FISA to 
expand these definitions to include devices that capture the dialing, routing, addressing, 
or signaling information related to electronic and Internet communications, as well as 
standard telephone calls.  Patriot Act, supra note 6, at § 214. 
 57 Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 201. 
 58 The FISC authorized the email metadata program even though it involved the collection 
of “an enormous volume of communications, the large majority of which will be unrelat-
ed to international terrorism” and that would include “communications of United States 
persons located within the United States who are not the subject of any FBI investiga-
tion.” See Kollar-Kotelly Opinion, supra note 25, at 28, 39.  For a more detailed description 
of this program, see PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 38–40. 
 59 National security letters, which are authorized under four federal statutes, are written 
directives by which the FBI can compel telephone companies, Internet service providers, 
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Title VI imposes detailed disclosure and reporting requirements 
on the government regarding the extent of surveillance activities un-
der FISA.  Under Section 601 of the Freedom Act, the Attorney Gen-
eral must provide an expanded annual report to Congress that in-
cludes the total number of applications made, granted, and denied 
for daily production of call detail records under the new framework 
described above.61  Furthermore, the DNI must furnish an annual re-
port to the public identifying, among other things, the total number 
of FISA court orders issued for electronic surveillance, call detail rec-
ords, and pen registers and trap and trace devices, as well as a good 
faith estimate of the number of targets of those orders.62  Finally, Title 
VII of the Freedom Act provides that the new surveillance framework 
remains in effect until December 15, 2019.63 
While the Freedom Act’s supporters hailed the new law as a histor-
ic limitation on the government’s surveillance powers as well as a res-
toration of Americans’ privacy rights,64 others had a less sanguine re-
sponse to the statute, noting that the reforms are actually quite 
modest.65  The Freedom Act curtails the NSA’s ability to gather all our 
phone metadata under Section 215, but does not terminate the pro-
gram, which is why many privacy and civil liberties advocates, includ-
ing both the ACLU and the Tea Party, had called for Congress to al-
low the provision to expire altogether.66  Although the government 
 
banks, credit agencies, and other institutions to produce records about their customers. 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS:  ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN 
IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF USE IN 2007 THROUGH 2009, at 
2–3 (Aug. 2014). 
 60 Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 501. 
 61 Id. at § 601. 
 62 Id. at § 602–03. 
 63 Id. at § 705. 
 64 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Passes Historic Lee-Leahy USA Free-
dom Act (June 2, 2015), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-passes-historic-lee-
leahy-usa-freedom-act (stating that the Freedom Act will enact the most significant re-
forms to government since the Patriot Act and it will help to ensure the privacy rights of 
all Americans). 
 65 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 11 (quoting ACLU representative that Freedom Act failed to 
achieve “comprehensive reform”); Sam Sacks, USA Freedom Act Passes House, Codifying Bulk 
Collection for First Time, Critics Say, THE INTERCEPT (May 13, 2015), https://firstlook.org
/theintercept/2015/05/13/usa-freedom-act/ (noting statements by House Representa-
tives who voted against the Freedom Act because they believed it did not go far enough to 
protect civil liberties). 
 66 See John Hudson, Tea Party and ACLU Call on Congress to let Patriot Act Expire, FOREIGN 
POLICY (May 29, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/tea-party-and-aclu-call-on-
congress-to-let-patriot-act-expire/ (“In an extreme case of strange bedfellows, a top Tea 
Party group and the American Civil Liberties Union are pressing lawmakers to allow the 
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will no longer store all our telephony metadata, it will be able to ac-
cess the same two-hops worth of metadata authorized under the for-
mer Section 215 program,67 an amount that a former NSA-analyst-
turned-whistleblower has estimated could provide the government 
with billions of call records.68  Indeed, the Office of the Director of 
National Security stated in November 2015 that “the overall volume 
of call detail records subject to query pursuant to court order is 
greater under [the] USA FREEDOM ACT” than under the former 
Section 215 program.69 
Even more importantly, the Freedom Act does not curtail the gov-
ernment’s power to collect communications metadata under other 
laws such as EO 12333, discussed below.  In this regard, statements 
made by members of the intelligence community after passage of the 
Freedom Act were telling.  Less than two weeks after the Freedom Act 
was signed into law, former NSA Director General Michael Hayden 
indicated that Congress had let the NSA get off easy: 
If somebody would come up to me and say, “Look, Hayden, here’s the 
thing: This Snowden thing is going to be a nightmare for you guys for 
about two years.  And when we get all done with it, what you’re going to 
be required to do is that little 215 program about American telephony 
metadata—and, by the way, you can still have access to it, but you got to 
go to the court and get access to it from the companies, rather than keep 
it to yourself”—I go:  “And this is it after two years? Cool!”70 
Given that the Freedom Act merely limits what General Hayden de-
scribed as “that little 215 program” while it allows the government’s 
metadata collection activities to continue under other laws, it is un-
surprising that a former senior intelligence official referred to the 
 
controversial provisions of the Patriot Act that authorize the National Security Agency’s 
broad surveillance activities to expire.”). 
 67 The FISC originally authorized the NSA to gather phone records that were three “hops” 
removed from the original seed identifier.  See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 3–4 
(stating that under the FISC’s order, the NSA may also obtain information concerning 
second and third-tier contacts of the identifier).  In January 2014, President Obama indi-
cated that going forward, the NSA would limit its contact chaining to two “hops.”  See 
Mark Landler & Charlie Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on Phone Spying, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A6. 
 68 See Steven Nelson, NSA Whistleblowers Oppose Freedom Act, Endorse Long-Shot Bill, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/27/ nsa-
whistleblowers-oppose-freedom-act-endorse-long-shot-bill. 
 69 See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Fact Sheet:  Implementation of the USA 
FREEDOM ACT of 2015, 3 (2015), http://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/USAFA%20 Imple-
mentation%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
 70 Dan Froomkin, Hayden Mocks Extent of Post-Snowden Reform:  “And This is it After Two Years? 
Cool!”, THE INTERCEPT (June 17, 2015), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/ 2015
/06/17/hayden-mocks-extent-post-snowden-surveillance-reform-2-years-cool/. 
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Freedom Act’s passage as “a big win for the NSA, and a huge nothing 
burger for the privacy community.”71 
B.  Executive Order 12333 
Compare the Section 215 domestic metadata collection program 
as limited by the Freedom Act with foreign data collection conducted 
pursuant to EO 12333.72  EO 12333 provides the framework under 
which the nation’s intelligence agencies engage in foreign intelli-
gence gathering.  Issued by President Reagan in 1981, this little-
known executive order (referred to as “twelve-triple-three”) is consid-
ered by the NSA to be the “foundational authority” pursuant to which 
it collects, retains, analyzes, and disseminates signals intelligence in-
formation.73  To the extent that the NSA’s intelligence-gathering ac-
tivities fall outside the scope of FISA, those activities are governed by 
EO 12333 and have not been subject to judicial review or significant 
Congressional oversight.74  Electronic surveillance conducted under 
EO 12333 reportedly is huge; NSA data collection under its auspices 
is said to dwarf that gathered under the former Section 215 telepho-
ny metadata program or any other FISA authority.75  For example, the 
Washington Post reported in 2013 that under EO 12333, the NSA had 
infiltrated the fiber optic connections that link Yahoo and Google’s 
 
 71 Shane Harris, ‘Big Win’ for Big Brother:  NSA Celebrates the Bill That’s Designed to Cuff Them, 
DAILYBEAST (May 14, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/14/nsa-
loves-the-nothing-burger-spying-reform-bill.html. 
 72 EO 12333, supra note 13. 
 73 See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2.  The NSA defines “signals intelligence” as “in-
telligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as 
communications systems, radars, and weapons systems.”  Nat’l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. 
Serv., Signals Intelligence, www.nsa.gov/sigint/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
 74 See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2; see also Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism 
and the Nat’l Sec. Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 130 (2015) (“For 
the wide swathes of foreign intelligence surveillance that are not covered by FISA, regula-
tion under Executive Order 12,333 occurs without judicial involvement.”); Ali Watkins, 
Most of NSA’s Data Collection Authorized by Order Ronald Reagan Issued, MCCLATCHY DC (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/
article24759289.html  (quoting Sen. Dianne Feinstein that Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee has not been able to oversee EO 12333 surveillance programs “sufficiently” because 
“they are under the executive branch entirely”). 
 75 See Nat’l Sec. Admin.:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. 1 (2013) 
(opening statement of Keith B. Alexander, Dir., NSA), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/10-2-13AlexanderTestimony.pdf (stating that the NSA conducts most of 
its intelligence activities “solely pursuant to the authorities provided by Executive Order 
12333”); Watkins, supra note 74. 
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overseas data centers, which allowed the agency to collect more than 
181 million communications records in a one-month period.76 
In a nutshell, EO 12333 authorizes the government to engage in 
electronic surveillance from abroad for foreign intelligence purposes.  
Specifically, Section 2.3(c) allows intelligence agencies to collect, re-
tain, and disseminate data regarding U.S. persons that is obtained as 
part of a lawful foreign intelligence investigation.77  Under FISA, the 
NSA may not intentionally target a U.S. person’s foreign communica-
tions without obtaining a FISA warrant.78  However, “vacuum cleaner” 
collection of communications from abroad is regarded by the NSA as 
not targeting anyone, which means that the protections of FISA do 
not apply.79  Overseas dragnet collections conducted under EO 12333 
 
 76 See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers 
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-
google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-
11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
 77 EO 12333, supra note 13, at § 2.3(c).  Any collection, retention, or dissemination of U.S. 
person information must be done in accordance with Attorney General approved proce-
dures.  Id. at § 2.3. 
 78 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2).  Department of Defense procedures implementing EO 12333 
also provide that communications of a U.S. person can be intentionally intercepted un-
der EO 12333 if the Attorney General finds probable cause to believe that the person is 
an agent of a foreign power and that the purpose of the interception is to collect signifi-
cant foreign intelligence. Nat’l Sec. Agency & Cent. Sec. Serv., Classified Annex to Dept. 
of Defense Procedures Under Exec. Order 12333 (Mar. 11, 2004) § 4A(1)(4), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/NSA%20Core%20Intelligence%20Oversight%20
Training%20Materials.pdf [hereinafter Classified Annex] (Classified Annex starts at p. 
118); see also Jonathan Mayer, Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales from 
the FISA Frontier, WEB POLICY (Dec. 3, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-
12333-on-american-soil/. 
 79 See NSA Dir. of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office Report, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Protections for Targeted SIGINT Activities Under Executive Order 12333 § 1 n.3 (Oct. 7, 
2014) [hereinafter Targeted SIGINT Report] (defining “targeted” signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) activities under EO 12333 as excluding “bulk” collection of intelligence data 
that the NSA acquires without the use of specific identifiers); Margo Schlanger, US Intelli-
gence Reforms Still Allow Plenty of Suspicionless Spying on Americans, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 13, 
2015), http://justsecurity.org/20033/guest-post-intelligence-reforms-plenty-suspicionless -
surveillance-americans/ (explaining that FISA does not regulate “(a) non-targeted  collec-
tion of wire communications, including communications between Americans within the 
US, as long as the actual wire being tapped is located overseas, or (b) non-targeted collec-
tion of wireless communications if at least one party to the communication is located 
abroad”). 
   In 2014, President Obama released Presidential Policy Directive 28, which limits the 
purposes for which U.S. intelligence agencies can engage in bulk collection to detecting 
and countering threats and activities related to (1) espionage; (2) terrorism; (3) weapons 
of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity; (5) the armed services; and (6) transnational 
crime.  Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, Signals Intelli-
gence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014) § 2, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-28.pdf [herein-
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cannot help but “incidentally” harvest sizeable quantities of U.S. per-
son communications, including, for example, both content and 
metadata of telephone calls made by Americans to or from a foreign 
country,80 or among Americans who happen to be living, traveling, or 
studying abroad.81 
These extraterritorial communications are presumed to belong to 
foreigners82 who, when situated abroad, lack any Fourth Amendment 
rights.83  Considering foreign-collected data to be of foreign prove-
nance made sense in 1981 when EO 12333 was adopted, because do-
mestic and international communications could be differentiated.84  
Back then, phone calls between two Americans traveled over phone 
lines located solely inside the United States, and therefore could not 
be swept up as part of the government’s foreign surveillance activities.  
Today, however, even purely domestic communications often travel 
 
after PPD-28].  It further states that “in no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk 
be used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent.”  Id.  However, 
the directive also provides that these limits on bulk collection “do not apply to signals in-
telligence data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted collection.”  Id. at § 2 n.5.  
It is unclear whether metadata gathered under EO 12333 would be considered a “collec-
tion” under PPD-28.  See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
 80 See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2 (“To the extent a person located outside the 
United States communicates with someone inside the United States or someone inside 
the United States communicates with a person located outside the United States those 
communications could also be collected [under EO 12333].”). 
 81 See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Records Calls of an Entire Nation, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 19, 2014, A1, A16, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-
surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-
calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html (describing NSA 
voice interception program that monitors and records every phone call made within a 
specified country, which also “pulls in a great deal of content from Americans who tele-
phone, visit and work in the target country”); Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA 
Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-
locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-
c6ca94801fac_story.html [hereinafter Gellman & Soltani, NSA Tracking] (quoting NSA of-
ficials confirming that the agency “incidentally” obtains location data from American cell 
phones when it taps into the cables that connect mobile networks around the world, and 
when Americans use their cell phones when they travel outside the United States). 
 82 For the purposes of EO 12333, “foreign communication” is defined as “a communication 
that involves a sender or an intended recipient who is outside the United States or that is 
entirely among foreign powers or between a foreign power and officials of a foreign pow-
er.”  Classified Annex, supra note 78, at § 2. See also Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg, 
Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution:  Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by 
Collecting Network Traffic Abroad, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 321–22, 335 
(2015). 
 83 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). 
 84 For an explanation and thoughtful critique of the notion of territoriality and the Fourth 
Amendment when applied to electronic data in general, and with respect to EO 12333 in 
particular, see Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015). 
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over international cables or are stored on backup servers located in 
foreign countries, where they are fair game for bulk collection meant 
to detect or counter terrorism.85 
This means that the NSA is free to leverage the global nature of 
our communications networks to harvest communications that, in the 
pre-digital era, would have been wholly domestic in character.  A 
former NSA chief analyst told the Washington Post in 2013 that the 
NSA prefers to avoid legal restrictions on data collection whenever 
possible.  “Look, NSA has platoons of lawyers, and their entire job is 
figuring out how to stay within the law and maximize collection by 
exploiting every loophole,” the former analyst said.  “It’s fair to say 
the rules are less restrictive under Executive Order 12333 than they 
are under FISA.”86  In fact, scholars have identified how the NSA 
could, if it so desired, deliberately use Internet network protocols to 
route American domestic network traffic abroad in order to scoop it 
up under EO 12333, thereby evading Fourth Amendment limitations 
and FISA procedures.87 (Whether the NSA would actually use these 
tactics is, of course, only a matter of speculation.)88 
Although EO 12333 specifically allows intelligence agencies to col-
lect, retain, and disseminate data on U.S. persons as part of lawful 
foreign intelligence operations,89 it also directs those agencies to “use 
the least intrusive techniques feasible within the United States or di-
rected against United States persons abroad.”90  Accordingly, the NSA 
must comply with AG-approved procedures for handling U.S. person 
 
 85 See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 183 (Dec. 2013), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PRG REPORT] (explaining that  “[e]ven for a person in the US who never knowingly 
sends communications abroad, there may be collection by US intelligence agencies out-
side of the US” under EO 12333);  see also Gellman & Soltani, supra note 76, (explaining 
how EO 12333 allows the NSA to intercept and collect vast numbers of communication 
records from overseas data centers); Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, Privacy Watch-
dog’s Next Target:  the Least-Known but Biggest Aspect of NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST (July 23, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/23/privacy-
watchdogs -next-target-the-least-known-but-biggest-aspect-of-nsa-surveillance (describing 
how Americans’ communications transit across national borders and are often stored 
overseas). 
 86 Gellman & Soltani, supra note 76. 
 87 See Arnbak & Goldberg, supra note 82, at 343–56. 
 88 The NSA responded to this suggestion by noting that the NSA must procure a FISA war-
rant to target any U.S. person for electronic surveillance, except in certain limited situa-
tions.  Id. at 339.  As the article authors note, however, this answer fails to respond to 
their concerns regarding untargeted, bulk network collection. Id. at 339–40. 
 89 EO 12333, supra note 13, at § 2.3(c). 
 90 Id. at § 2.4. 
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information acquired under EO 12333.91  Those procedures, howev-
er, are much more privacy protective with respect to communications 
content as opposed to communications metadata.  For example, NSA 
personnel are directed to make “every reasonable effort, through sur-
veys and technical means, to reduce to the maximum extent possible” 
any incidental collection of the content of domestic communications 
under EO 12333.92  While EO 12333 content-minimization require-
ments are not as stringent as those imposed on U.S. person commu-
nications collected incidentally or inadvertently under Section 702 of 
FISA,93 they at least provide some privacy protections with respect to 
the contents of incidentally acquired, domestic communications. 
Communications metadata is another matter. Thanks to Edward 
Snowden, we know that the NSA believes it has practically unlimited 
ability to analyze and augment Americans’ communications metadata 
gathered under EO 12333, and use it to create large-scale graphs of 
Americans’ social connections.  In September 2013, the New York 
Times published internal NSA documents indicating that, beginning 
in November 2010, the NSA changed its procedures to allow its ana-
lysts to contact chain EO 12333 metadata even when that metadata 
contained American selectors such as phone numbers and email ad-
dresses.94  Prior to that date, the NSA required analysts to stop contact 
 
 91 Id. at § 2.3. 
 92 See Classified Annex, supra note 78, at § 3.  For a summary of the minimization proce-
dures that apply to communications content collected by the NSA under EO 12333, see 
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, LEGAL FACT SHEET: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, at 126 (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Legal%20Fact%20Sheet%20Executive
%20Order%2012333.pdf [hereinafter NSA Legal FACT SHEET]. 
 93 For a thorough overview of surveillance conducted under Section 702 of the FISA 
Amendments Act, including an explanation of targeting and minimization procedures, 
see David Medine et al., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf 
[hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT].  According to the PCLOB Section 702 Re-
port, both communication content and metadata collected under Section 702 is consid-
ered to be a “communication,” and is therefore protected by minimization procedures.  
Id. at 127 n.524. 
   The NSA’s 2014 Section 702 minimization procedures have been publicly released.  
See Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., Exihibit B:  Minimization Procedures used by the 
National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Infor-
mation Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as 
Amended (2007), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-28/2014%20NSA%20702%
20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf. 
 94 See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. Citizens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013 at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/ us/nsa-
examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0 (linking NSA Contact-Chaining Memo 
and Example Social Network Graph, documents which have not been declassified or offi-
cially acknowledged by the government). 
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chaining when they bumped up against an American phone number, 
email address, or other metadata term.95  A NSA spokeswoman ex-
plained that the policy change reflected the Supreme Court’s 1979 
holding in Smith v. Maryland ,96 that Americans have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in, and hence no Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of, their phone records.97  The Times also revealed that the NSA 
enriches EO 12333 metadata by combining it with material from pub-
lic and commercial databases, GPS location information, Facebook 
profiles, and other sources.98  Several days later, then-NSA Director 
General Keith Alexander confirmed many of the article’s claims while 
testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 99 
The subsequently declassified NSA procedures described by the 
Times were approved by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey in 
2008 and are set out in a document entitled “Special Procedures 
Governing Communications Metadata Analysis” (“SPCMA”).100  Not 
fully implemented by the NSA until 2010,101 SPCMA authorizes the 
agency to conduct contact chaining (and undefined “other” analysis) 
on all EO 12333-collected communications metadata, limited only by 
the caveat that such analysis be performed for “valid foreign intelli-
gence purposes.”102  SPCMA imposes no hop limits to cabin the NSA’s 
ability to conduct social network analysis; rather, the NSA’s ability to 
contact chain any EO 12333 telephony or email metadata appears to 
be infinite: 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
 97 Risen & Poitras, supra note 94.  The NSA’s legal rationale for changing its procedures to 
allow contact chaining through American identifiers is set out in more detail in a top-
secret memorandum that was leaked by Edward Snowden but has not been declassified or 
officially acknowledged by the government.  See Memorandum for the Att’y Gen., from 
Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Proposed Amendment to Dept. of Def. Pro-
cedures to Permit the Nat’l Sec. Agency to Conduct Analysis of Communications Metada-
ta Associated with Persons in the United States 4–6 (Nov. 20, 2007), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-data-collection-justice-
department [hereinafter Wainstein Memo]. 
 98 Risen & Poitras, supra note 94. 
 99 Hearing on Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ meetings/continued-
oversight-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act (testimony of NSA Director Keith B. 
Alexander). 
100 NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., DEPT. OF DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING COMMUNICATIONS METADATA ANALYSIS (2008) [hereinafter SPCMA], 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0909/DoD%20Supplemental%20Procedures%202
0080314.pdf. 
101 See Risen & Poitras, supra note 94. 
102 SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 3(a).  SPCMA gives no indication what any other additional 
analysis might be. 
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Contact chaining . . . shows, for example, the telephone numbers or e-
mail addresses that a particular telephone number or e-mail address has 
been in contact with, or has attempted to contact.  Through this process, 
computer algorithms automatically identify not only the first tier of con-
tacts made by the seed telephone number or e-mail address, but also the 
further contacts made by the first tier of telephone numbers or e-mail 
addresses and so on.103 
By allowing the NSA to contact chain through American identifi-
ers for an unlimited number of hops, SPCMA theoretically provides 
the government with a means to acquire comprehensive databases of 
domestic calls and email records.  Nothing in the EO 12333 regime 
requires the government to limit metadata searches to identifiers for 
which it has a reasonable articulable suspicion of a link to terrorism; 
again, a foreign intelligence purpose is enough.  And unlike the 
Freedom Act, which requires the NSA to purge telephony metadata 
that is irrelevant to foreign intelligence, communications records ob-
tained under EO 12333 may be retained in a government database 
for at least five years.104 
With respect to dissemination of U.S. person information that the 
NSA incidentally acquires under EO 12333, the agency applies the 
same rules whether the information came from communications con-
tent or metadata.105  However, any privacy protections for U.S. person 
data contained in the AG-approved procedures implementing EO 
12333 do not apply to searches of communications metadata ob-
tained under that order.  This is because privacy protections provided 
by those documents only apply to information that is “collected” un-
der the government’s own definition.  Understanding how this works 
requires tracking a convoluted series of definitions contained in vari-
ous policy directives. 
 
103 Id. at § 2(b); see also SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (“SID”) MANAGEMENT 
DIRECTIVE NO. 424, SIGINT DEVELOPMENT—COMMUNICATIONS METADATA ANALYSIS 3 
(2010), https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/20150312-NSA-production.pdf 
(exhibit to letter) (stating that for a valid foreign intelligence purpose, communications 
metadata obtained under EO 12333 may be subject to “complete contact chain analysis”). 
104 See NAT. SEC. AGENCY, ET AL., UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE SP0018, § 
6 (2011) [hereinafter USSID 18], http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/ CLEANED
Final%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf.  See also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2015, Pub. L. No. 113-293, 128 Stat. 3990 (2014), § 309 (requiring intelligence agencies 
to limit retention to five years of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications to 
or from a U.S. person that were obtained without a court order, with certain exceptions, 
including for communications with foreign intelligence value). 
105 See NSA LEGAL FACT SHEET, supra note 92, at 126 (summarizing dissemination standards 
and explaining that they are the same for metadata and communication content of or 
concerning U.S. persons). 
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First, Department of Defense (“DoD”) Directive 5240.1-R, which 
sets out procedures regarding intelligence activities affecting U.S. 
persons, provides that data acquired electronically is not “collected” 
until it has been received for use by an intelligence agency and “pro-
cessed into intelligible form.”106  While the meaning of “intelligible 
form” is not defined, a further NSA directive explains that infor-
mation is not “collected” until an NSA analyst intentionally “task[s] 
or selects” a communication for “subsequent processing aimed at re-
porting or retention as a file record.”107  Finally, SPCMA amended 
DoD Directive 5240.1-R to “clarify” that “contact chaining and other 
metadata analysis do not qualify as ‘interception’ or ‘selection’ of 
communications.”108  In this way, the intelligence community has re-
defined “collection” to exclude electronic gathering and analysis of 
communications metadata from otherwise applicable minimization 
procedures.109  Remember that these policies and procedures are de-
veloped and applied solely within the executive branch without FISC 
approval, and that Congress has not chosen to subject NSA activities 
under EO 12333 to significant oversight.110 
From this discussion, it should be clear why EO 12333 has been 
described as a legal loophole that allows the NSA to take advantage of 
our global communications network to justify warrantless surveillance 
of Americans.111  In a 2014 Washington Post op-ed piece, former State 
Department official-turned-whistleblower, John Napier Tye, tried to 
warn Americans about the massive scope of NSA surveillance under 
EO 12333, suggesting that the former Section 215 telephony metada-
 
106 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD 
INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS, § C2.2.1 (1982). 
107 USSID 18, supra note 104, at § 9.2. 
108 SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 4. 
109 For helpful analysis and explanation regarding these definitions and their implications, 
see Faiza Patel, How the Second Circuit’s Decision in Clapper Informs the Section 215 Discussion, 
JUST SECURITY (May 11, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/22944/clapper-section-215-
discussion/; Did the Second Circuit Decision ALSO Blow Up SPCMA?, EMPTYWHEEL (May 11, 
2015), https://www.emptywheel.net/2015/05/11/did-the-second-circuit-decision-also-
blow-up-spcma/. 
110 According to the Wainstein Memo, the NSA briefed the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding SPCMA 
sometime prior to Nov. 20, 2007. See Wainstein Memo, supra note 97, at 3. 
111 See John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule that Lets the NSA Spy on 
Americans, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-
executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/
93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html (arguing that EO 12333 contains a 
legal loophole that allows for U.S. persons’ communications “incidentally” collected to be 
retained, despite the fact that EO 12333 prohibits U.S. persons from being targeted with-
out a court order). 
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ta program was merely “a mechanism to backfill that portion of U.S. 
person data that cannot be collected overseas under 12333.”112  Tye 
also hinted that the NSA still stockpiles U.S person email and other 
Internet metadata under EO 12333, despite assurances by General 
Alexander that the FISC-approved program under the pen regis-
ter/trap and trace provisions of the Patriot Act discussed earlier had 
been discontinued in 2011 to “better protect civil liberties and priva-
cy.”113  Although the Freedom Act forbids the NSA from using the Pa-
triot Act provisions to restart this program in bulk, again, the new law 
has no effect on the NSA’s activities under EO 12333.114 
To recap, many Americans were outraged to learn in 2013 that 
the NSA, with FISC approval, was collecting and analyzing their call 
detail records without their knowledge or consent under the former 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act.  After two years of debate, Congress 
imposed some additional limits on the government’s ability to collect 
and scrutinize our telephone or email metadata by enacting the 
Freedom Act.  Some believe these changes are significant; others 
have been more critical.  Congressional reforms to FISA and the Pa-
triot Act, however, are futile if the government can simply continue 
to gather and analyze our communications metadata as before via an 
alternate path.  Under EO 12333, the NSA can vacuum up domestic 
communications metadata in bulk as long as the capture occurs from 
a foreign source or the communications involve one communicant in 
a foreign country.  The NSA is then free to augment that metadata 
with other information and map the social connections of American 
citizens, out to an unlimited number of hops, for foreign intelligence 
purposes.  The NSA claims these actions are compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment because Americans have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their communications metadata.  In the next Part, I 
focus on how communications privacy developed under the Fourth 
 
112 Id.  Edward Snowden has described EO 12333 as “what the NSA uses when the other [le-
gal] authorities aren’t aggressive enough or aren’t catching as much [data] as they’d 
like.”  Chris Morran, John Oliver Gets Edward Snowden to Explain Government Snooping in 
Terms of Penis Photos, CONSUMERIST (Apr. 6, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/04/
06/john-oliver-gets-edward-snowden-to-explain-government-snooping-in-terms-of-penis-
photos/. 
113 Tye, supra note 111 (noting that Alexander said only that the NSA stopped collecting this 
data under the Patriot Act, not that it did not collect the data at all). 
114 The NSA admitted as much in November 2015, when it released an inspector general’s 
report confirming that the Patriot Act email dragnet had been shut down in part because 
the same domestic Internet metadata could be collected abroad under EO 12333 and an-
alyzed pursuant to SPCMA.  See Charlie Savage, File Says N.S.A. Found Way to Replace Email 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/
 records-show-email-analysis-continued-after-nsa-program-ended.html?_r=0. 
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Amendment, rather than the First, and consider whether Smith v. 
Maryland115 justifies the NSA’s almost-unlimited ability to collect and 
analyze domestic communications metadata under EO 12333. 
 
II.  COMMUNICATIONS METADATA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Following the Snowden revelations, former President Jimmy 
Carter famously remarked that he assumes the NSA monitors his 
electronic communications; accordingly, when he desires to corre-
spond privately with foreign leaders, he writes a letter and posts it in 
the U.S. mail.116  Assuming President Carter seeks to shield only the 
contents of his snail mail, his approach is sound:  the Supreme Court 
first recognized a right to communications privacy in the context of 
sealed letters.  However, the names and addresses of the former pres-
ident’s correspondents, as well as postmarks or other envelope nota-
tions—in effect, the communications metadata associated with those 
letters—can, and well may, be collected by the government without 
triggering the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.117  In this 
Part, I trace how the Court grounded communications privacy in the 
Fourth Amendment, rather than the First, and how it developed the 
third party doctrine in the context of telephone call detail records.  
Although this is well-travelled territory, I set out these familiar prece-
dents to show how they form the basis for the government’s constitu-
tional argument justifying today’s bulk metadata surveillance pro-
grams. 
A.  Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment Path 
Somewhat surprisingly, the protection of communications privacy 
in America originated not from judicial interpretations of the Consti-
tution, but rather from early postal policies.118  At least in part in re-
 
115 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
116 David Jackson, Carter Uses Snail Mail to Evade NSA, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2014/03/24/obama-jimmy-carter-national-
security-agency-surveillance-snail-mail/6818605/. 
117 In July 2013, The New York Times revealed the existence of the Mail Isolation Control and 
Tracking program, under which U.S. Postal Service computers photograph the outside of 
every piece of mail processed in the United States, thereby providing the government 
with a record of mail metadata.  See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law 
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/07/ 04/us/ moni-
toring-of-snail-mail.html. 
118 See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications 
Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557 (2007) (“[A]s a historical matter, it was the post office—
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sponse to a history of British postal surveillance,119 Congress in 1792 
enacted the Postal Service Act, which made it a crime for postal offi-
cials to open sealed letters unless they were undeliverable.120  This 
early postal policy, still reflected in the law today,121 created public 
confidence in the sanctity of the mails as well as a public expectation 
regarding communications privacy, and helped build what Professor 
Jack Balkin has termed an “infrastructure of free expression”122 in the 
new country. 
The Supreme Court first considered a claim of communications 
privacy in Ex parte Jackson,123 an 1878 case where the petitioner relied 
on the First Amendment to challenge his conviction under a federal 
law prohibiting all lottery advertisements, even those for legal lotter-
ies, from the mail.  Petitioner’s counsel argued that the law constitut-
ed content-based censorship, which, if allowed, would empower Con-
gress to exclude from the mail communications on any topic it found 
objectionable.124  Justice Stephen Field, writing for a unanimous 
Court, upheld the constitutionality of the statute as a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to prohibit materials that “have a demoralizing in-
fluence upon the people”125 from the mails; he did not directly ad-
dress the petitioner’s specific First Amendment claim.126  Rather, Jus-
tice Field, in dicta, located privacy protection for letters and sealed 
packages in the Fourth Amendment, drawing a distinction between 
“what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and 
sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspec-
tion, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed 
matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined.”127 
Hence, sealed, first-class letters deposited in the U.S. mail for de-
livery became the sender’s papers for the purposes of the Fourth 
 
not the Fourth Amendment of its own independent force—that originally gave us the no-
tion of communications privacy that we now view as an abstract constitutional principle 
applicable to telephone conversations, e-mails, and the like.”). 
119 Id. at 560–65. 
120 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, §§ 16, 18, 1 Stat. 232, 236–37. 
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000) (outlining the misdemeanor offense for a Postal Service of-
ficer or employee who unlawfully destroys, delays, or opens mail). 
122 Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2012). 
123 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
124 Id. at 730–31. 
125 Id. at 736. 
126 Justice Field did, however, recognize that mail regulations excluding certain publications 
from the mail could deliver a “fatal blow” to the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free 
press. Id. at 733, 735. 
127 Id. at 733. 
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Amendment; their contents (as opposed to “what is open to inspec-
tion,” such as any envelope notations that could be viewed by all) 
were not subject to inspection in transit without a warrant.  Although 
the Court could have upheld the statute on First Amendment 
grounds pursuant to the bad tendency test then used to evaluate 
speech restrictions,128 the Court declined to do so.  Today, the statute 
most certainly would be invalid as an unconstitutional restriction of 
commercial speech, but in 1878, First Amendment protection for ad-
vertising was almost a hundred years away.129  Rather, in an example 
of path dependency,130 Ex parte Jackson situated the Court’s communi-
cations privacy analysis in the Fourth Amendment, where it has re-
mained. 
B.  Electronic Eavesdropping and False Friends 
The advent of electronic communications posed two related ques-
tions for the Court: are conversations—spoken words—covered by 
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable search and 
seizure; and, if so, may the government use electronic means to inter-
cept those words?  By the mid-twentieth century, the Court had estab-
lished that oral statements, as well as papers and effects, fall within 
Fourth Amendment protections.131  With respect to government wire-
tapping, the Court in the landmark 1967 case of Katz v. United States 
drew a distinction between what a person “knowingly exposes to the 
public” and what he or she “seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public,” holding that the Fourth Amendment 
 
128 The Court remarked that the statute merely prohibited “corrupting publications and ar-
ticles” about lotteries—”institutions which are supposed to have a demoralizing influence 
upon the people.”  Id. at 736. Regarding the “bad tendency” test, see DAVID M. RABBAN, 
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132 (1997) (“The most pervasive and fundamental 
judicial approach to free speech issues between the Civil War and World War I used the 
bad tendency test derived from Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the English 
common law in the eighteenth century.”). 
129 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
130 By this I mean simply that precedent in a particular area of law may then require, steer, 
or prohibit the direction of certain choices by the Court in future decisions.  See Michael 
J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 905 (2005) 
(exploring the two prevailing views of precedent in scholarly literature, including path 
dependency). 
131 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505 (1961) (explaining “the protections of the Fourth Amendment are surely not 
limited to tangibles, but can extend as well to oral statements”)); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) 
(holding “that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal 
statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of ‘papers and effects’”)). 
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only protects the latter.132  The defendant, accordingly, was entitled to 
exclude the “uninvited ear” of the government from his phone con-
versations even though they occurred in a public phone booth.133  Be-
cause the government had failed to obtain a warrant, its conduct did 
not comport with the Fourth Amendment.134 
The real take-away from Katz, however, came from Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II’s concurrence where he articulated the iconic two-
part reasonable expectation of privacy test:  to show that the govern-
ment conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, an individual must have “an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy” and that expectation of privacy must be one “that so-
ciety is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”135  Within a year, the 
Court had adopted Justice Harlan’s test as the controlling principle 
from Katz,136 and, critical commentary notwithstanding,137 courts have 
applied it ever since.  As applied by the Court in later cases, Justice 
Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test turned into a balanc-
ing of interests approach where judges consider all the circumstances 
surrounding a search to determine its reasonableness.138 
During these same years, the Court also addressed questions of 
communications privacy in the context of criminal suspects who re-
vealed incriminating information to government agents or inform-
ants.  In these false friend cases, the Court relied on an assumption of 
 
132 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
133 Id. at 352. 
134 Id. at 358–59. 
135 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
136 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that ‘the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places,’ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), and 
wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ id., at 361 (Mr. 
Justice Harlan, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental in-
trusion.”); see also United States v, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have 
applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation 
occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”). 
137 The reasonable expectation of privacy test has been roundly criticized for its unpredicta-
ble and inconsistent results, as well as for its subjectivity and circularity.  See, e.g., Richard 
A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 
188 (1979) (describing the Katz test as “circular” because an individual’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy will always depend upon “what the legal rule is”); Daniel J. Solove, 
Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010) (criticizing the Katz test 
as having “led to a contentious jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and inco-
herence”). 
138 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (stating that Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness “is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstanc-
es”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (concluding that the legality of a war-
rantless search of a public school student “should depend simply on the reasonableness, 
under all the circumstances, of the search”). 
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the risk theory to hold that when a suspect exchanges information 
with a confederate, the suspect has no reasonable expectation that 
the information will remain private.139  According to the Court, it 
would be unreasonable for the suspect in that situation to believe ei-
ther that (1) the confederate will not share the information with law 
enforcement in the future; or (2) the confederate is not already 
working for the government, and may be recording or transmitting 
the conversation as it occurs.140 
C.  Communications Metadata and the Third Party Doctrine 
Having developed the assumption of the risk theory in the false 
friend cases, the Court next applied it to establish that individuals 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information they share 
with a third-party service provider.  In United States v. Miller,141 the 
Court cited the false friend cases to hold that a bank depositor as-
sumes the risk that the bank will provide her financial records to the 
government in response to a subpoena duces tecum, even though the 
depositor may have believed the bank would keep the records confi-
dential.142  Whereas Miller dealt with financial records, the Court in 
Smith v. Maryland143 applied the assumption of the risk rationale to 
what today we would call communications metadata—in this case, 
records of phone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect and held by 
the telephone company.  There, at law enforcement request, a local 
phone company placed a pen register on a robbery suspect’s phone 
line after the victim reported receiving threatening calls from a man 
who identified himself as her assailant.144  When the device revealed 
that, on the very day it was installed, the suspect called the victim’s 
 
139 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (explaining “[n]either this Court 
nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a 
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdo-
ing will not reveal it”); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (holding the 
Fourth Amendment is not violated when a “home is converted into a commercial center 
. . . for purposes of transacting unlawful business” and a government agent enters with an 
invitation to do business). 
140 See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (noting that by speaking in front of an informant, the de-
fendant had mistakenly relied on the loyalty of someone he mistook for a friend). 
141 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
142 Id. at 443. (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohib-
it the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Govern-
ment authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence place in the third party will not be be-
trayed.”). 
143 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
144 Id. at 737. 
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home number, police obtained a warrant to search the suspect’s 
house.145  At trial, the suspect relied on Katz to argue that all evidence 
derived from the pen register had been obtained in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.146 
The Court disagreed, holding that the placement of a pen register 
on a telephone phone line did not qualify as a Fourth Amendment 
search.147  The Court emphasized the pen register’s limited ability to 
reveal only numbers dialed from a particular phone, not whether a 
call was completed or what was said by either party.148  Given that all 
subscribers know that the phone company keeps records of their calls 
for billing and other purposes, the Court found it implausible that 
phone customers could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
those records.149 
Dissenting, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the call logs did, in 
fact, contain substantive information.  Few telephone customers 
would consent to have a list of their phone calls made public, Justice 
Stewart observed, not because the numbers would reveal criminal 
conduct, but because they “easily could reveal the identities of the 
persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate de-
tails of a person’s life.”150  In a separate dissent, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall distinguished the false friend cases as situations where the 
defendants had chosen whether, and to whom, to confide their se-
crets; the defendant in Smith had no choice but to assume the risk of 
government surveillance to be able to use his telephone.151  Justice 
Marshall recognized that warrantless use of pen registers implicates 
both Fourth and First Amendment values, noting in particular how 
government monitoring of call records could chill both political as-
sociation and freedom of the press.152 
Almost from the day it was decided, Smith has been harshly criti-
cized, both as misapprehending the expectations of privacy that peo-
ple attach to personal records they must, of necessity, deposit with 
 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 737–38. 
147 Id. at 745–46. 
148 Id. at 741–42. 
149 Id. at 742–43. It should be noted that the Smith holding turned on the Court’s evaluation 
of whether someone who, having revealed his phone calls to the phone company, could 
reasonably expect those records to be held in confidence—not merely that government 
capture of non-content information is not a search. 
150 Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 751. 
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third parties,153 and for giving the government an untoward ability to 
monitor its citizens.154  Although Smith raises serious privacy concerns, 
the scope of the surveillance upheld in Smith was both more targeted 
and much narrower in scope than bulk metadata collection and anal-
ysis conducted under EO 12333.155  In Smith, a simple device was 
placed on the phone line of one specific, named individual whom po-
lice had good reason to suspect.  Although the NSA will not reveal 
the volume of incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications 
metadata collected under EO 12333,156 intelligence officials have in-
dicated that the former Section 215 program was diminutive in com-
parison.157  Given that bulk collection is, by definition, untargeted, it 
 
153 See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Priva-
cy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1314–15 (1981) (describing the Court’s analysis in Smith as 
“misguided”); Clifford S. Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nul-
lification of Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 557, 567–74 (1980) (criticizing the 
Court’s factual assumptions and legal analysis in Smith); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveil-
lance:  Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 40, 66 (2004) (faulting 
the Court in Smith for failing to consider how much privacy the law should grant to in-
formation that most individuals would consider to be private); Anita Ramasastry, Lost in 
Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 757, 764 (2006) (disputing that individuals give up 
their expectation of privacy in information they provide to third parties in the course of 
modern life). 
   Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Pen Register Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012)), which re-
quires the government to procure a court order before installing a pen register.  This is 
easier for the government to obtain than a traditional warrant; it need only certify that 
the use of the pen register is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3123(a). 
154 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2008) (citing Smith as an example of how the Court has “debilitated the Fourth Amend-
ment” as a tool to prevent government abuse of power); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth 
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1254–56 (1983) 
(arguing that in Smith, the Court gave the government too much power to collect phone 
records of those who are not guilty or even suspected of criminal activity). 
155 The scope of the surveillance upheld in Smith was also much narrower than that conduct-
ed by the NSA under the former Section 215 telephony metadata collection program.  
See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional Concerns, 
37 HARV. J.L. & POL’Y, 757, 869–71 (2014) (distinguishing telephony metadata collection 
program from pen register installation in Smith); PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 
7, at 114 (stating that Smith “does not provide a good fit” for the Section 215 telephony 
metadata collection program). 
156 See Gellman & Soltani, supra note 81 (quoting intelligence officials saying that it would be 
“awkward” or impossible to calculate the number of American cell phones tracked over-
seas by the NSA). 
157 See generally supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.  Former State Department official 
John Napier Tye has stated that the NSA collects “a huge amount of Americans’ commu-
nications and data” under EO 12333.  Timothy B. Lee, Why the Latest Patriot Act Reform 
Won’t Be Enough To Rein in the NSA, VOX (June 8, 2015, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/7/8741095/patriot-nsa-john-tye. 
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stands to reason that it would include communication records be-
longing to many U.S. persons who have no connection to terrorism.  
Police monitored the Smith defendant’s phone for no more than two 
days to see whether he dialed only one specific phone number (the 
victim’s).158  The NSA has been collecting telephony and email 
metadata associated with U.S. persons under EO 12333 at least since 
2007159 (and probably long before).160 
The pen register information provided in Smith was also less re-
vealing than bulk metadata collection under EO 12333—the pen reg-
ister recorded only the numbers dialed from one suspect’s phone.  
Call records collected and analyzed by the NSA under EO 12333 in-
clude not only the telephone numbers of calls dialed, but also of 
those received, as well as the date, time,  and duration of the call.161  
Email metadata includes information that appears on the “to,” 
“from,” “cc,” and “bcc” (although not the “subject”) lines, plus the In-
ternet-protocol (IP) address of the computer from which an email 
was sent, IP address of routers and servers that handled the email 
transmission, plus login and inbox information if a user accesses a 
web-based email account.162  As described in Part I, the NSA relies on 
the third party doctrine to justify performing contact chaining on 
communications metadata acquired under EO 12333, obtaining an 
unlimited number of hops worth of additional records as long as its 
investigation serves a valid foreign intelligence purpose and keeping 
those records for at least five years.163 
Not only is this information much richer than that disclosed by 
the pen register in Smith, the communications metadata we generate 
every day are also more voluminous than anything a time traveler 
from the 1970s could possibly imagine.  We rely today on various 
forms of electronic communications to handle everyday tasks and 
connect with almost anyone, anywhere, at any time in a way that was 
inconceivable in 1979.  At the same time, the investigative tools used 
 
158 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
159 See Office of General Counsel, Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Sharing of 
“Raw SIGINT” Through Database Access 4–5 (July 12, 2007) (referring to NSA collection 
of bulk telephony metadata containing numbers with U.S. area codes, and describing dif-
ficulty determining whether email metadata were foreign or domestic). 
160 The Drug Enforcement Agency admitted that it used administrative subpoenas to collect 
telephony records of billions of Americans’ calls to foreign countries beginning back in 
1992.  See Brad Heath, U.S. Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-
surveillance-operation/70808616/. 
161 See SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 2. 
162 Id. 
163 See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
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today by the government to aggregate, track, and analyze communi-
cations metadata are markedly more sophisticated than anything 
available during the Smith era. 
D.  The Future of the Third Party Doctrine 
Critics of the third party doctrine found reason to hope for its 
demise based on the recent case of United States v. Jones,164 where five 
members of the Court demonstrated a heightened sensitivity to the 
privacy implications of new technology.  The Jones Court unanimously 
held that the government must obtain a warrant to attach a global 
positioning system device to a car to track its movements for twenty-
eight days.165  The government had argued that the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy while driving a car on the public 
roads, where he could be seen by all.166  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing 
for the majority, rejected this approach, concluding that the govern-
ment had conducted a Fourth Amendment search by intruding onto, 
and physically occupying, private property to obtain information.167 
In a concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ste-
phen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, Justice Samuel Alito applied the Katz 
formula to conclude that long-term monitoring facilitated by new 
technology violated the defendant’s reasonable expectations of priva-
cy.168  Justice Alito noted that modern technology has given law en-
forcement the ability to engage in constant, pervasive monitoring 
that would have been logistically impossible as well as cost-prohibitive 
in the pre-digital age.169  Although he called on legislatures to limit 
law enforcement use of tracking technology, in the absence of statu-
tory guidelines, Justice Alito concluded that the lengthy monitoring 
here violated the Fourth Amendment.170  “For [most] offenses,” he 
wrote, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents 
and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individ-
ual’s car for a very long period.”171 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Sonia Sotomayor addressed the 
third party issue head on, and called for its reconsideration in light of 
 
164 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
165 Id. at 947–49. 
166 Id. at 950. 
167 Id. at 949. 
168 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
169 Id. at 963–64. 
170 Id. at 964. 
171 Id. 
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modern technology.172  Describing the doctrine as “ill suited to the 
digital age,” she noted that people today have no choice but to reveal 
information about themselves in the course of completing their daily 
tasks.173  She also recognized the importance of First Amendment val-
ues in the Fourth Amendment calculation, noting that government 
monitoring has a chilling effect on speech and association.174  Accord-
ingly, Justice Sotomayor said she was unwilling to “assume that all in-
formation voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a 
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.”175 
Of course, Jones did not involve communications metadata and, 
strictly speaking, left the Smith holding unchanged.  Nevertheless, 
taken together, the concurring opinions in Jones show that at least five 
Justices have misgivings about intrusive government surveillance 
made possible by modern technology.  Justice Alito noted a particular 
concern with the ability of wireless carriers to track, record, and ag-
gregate the location of cell phone users,176 a type of metadata that has 
been collected by the NSA in the past.177  In another recent case, Riley 
v. California,178 the Court unanimously held that police must obtain a 
warrant before searching data on an arrestee’s cell phone.  In his 
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts noted the privacy 
interests associated with digital devices, observing that cell phones 
can store much more private information than a person typically 
would carry in a handbag or wallet.179  The Chief Justice also focused 
on cell phone location data, citing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
in Jones for the proposition that historic location data can be used to 
reconstruct a person’s minute-by-minute movements, both outside 
and indoors.180 
Although these two cases may herald a willingness by the Court to 
adapt the Fourth Amendment to the digital age, Smith has yet to be 
 
172 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 956. 
175 Id. at 957. 
176 Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
177 See Charlie Savage, In Test Project, N.S.A. Tracked Cellphone Locations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/us/nsa-experiment-traced-us-cellphone-
locations.html. 
178 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
179 Id. at 2488–89. 
180 Id. at 2490. 
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overruled.181  Indeed, Smith remains the major precedent on which 
both the government and courts consistently have relied to justify or 
uphold the bulk collection of communications metadata.  Before the 
passage of the Freedom Act, a handful of challengers contested the 
constitutionality of the former Section 215 telephony metadata pro-
gram in court, but only one district court judge suggested that it like-
ly violated the Fourth Amendment—a holding later reversed on 
standing grounds by the D.C. Circuit.182  The other courts that 
reached the constitutional question applied Smith to hold that phone 
subscribers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in call detail 
records shared with their telecommunications providers.183 
The FISC, as well, has repeatedly invoked Smith and the third par-
ty doctrine to reauthorize telephony metadata collection under the 
former Section 215.184  For example, in a post-Jones decision, FISC 
Judge Eagan cited Smith (with no mention of Jones) to approve the 
program, despite its bulk nature.  “[W]here one individual does not 
have a Fourth Amendment interest,” she wrote, “grouping together a 
large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a 
Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”185  
More recently, the FISC again applied Smith to deny a constitutional 
challenge to the Freedom Act’s 180-day extension of the former Sec-
tion 215 program, stating that with regard to the nature of the data 
 
181 In Riley, Chief Justice Roberts warned in a footnote not to read too much into a decision 
that did not address “whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital infor-
mation amounts to a search under other circumstances.” Id. at 2489–90 n.1. 
182 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32–42 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Smith to find that citizens have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in their telephony metadata, and enjoining the NSA telephony metadata collection 
program as a likely violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
   In 2015, the Second Circuit held that the NSA telephony metadata collection pro-
gram revealed by Edward Snowden exceeded the statutory authority provided to the gov-
ernment under the former Section 215 of the Patriot Act.  ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F. 3d 
787 (2d Cir. 2015).  While the court did not reach the challengers’ Fourth Amendment 
claims, it described those constitutional claims as both “vexing,” id. at 821,  and “daunt-
ing,” id. at 825. 
183 See Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1007 (D. Idaho 2014); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013). 
184 See Opinion and Order, In Re Appl. of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things (No. BR 15-75) and In Re Motion in Opp’n 
to Government’s Request to Resume Bulk Data Collection Under Patriot Act Section 215 
(No. 15-01), at 12-13 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/ sites/
default/files/BR%2015-75%20Misc%2015-01%20Opinion%20and%20Order.pdf  [here-
inafter Mosman opinion] (listing FISC opinions upholding telephony metadata program 
under Fourth Amendment). 
185 Eagan opinion, supra note 25, at 9. 
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acquired, the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ call detail records 
is “indistinguishable” from the pen register information gathered in 
the 1979 case.186 
While one can disagree with the FISC’s conclusions, at least gov-
ernment surveillance programs authorized under FISA are subject to 
some type of court approval.  No similar opportunity for FISC review 
exists with respect to surveillance conducted under EO 12333.  Indi-
vidual Fourth Amendment challenges to EO 12333 bulk metadata 
collection are highly unlikely to be heard in court at all, given that, 
absent another Edward Snowden, a litigant will be hard-pressed to 
demonstrate that his or her communications metadata have been 
gathered or analyzed under the top-secret program.187  Still, the con-
stitutional validity of the third party doctrine remains critical be-
cause—as discussed in Part I—the NSA relies on Smith to justify not 
only bulk collections, but also limitless contact chaining of communi-
cations metadata that the agency knows belong to or are associated 
with U.S. persons.188 
If, thanks to Smith, the Fourth Amendment fails adequately to pro-
tect the privacy of our communications metadata, can we avoid the 
third party doctrine altogether by looking to the First Amendment 
for relief?  The next Part examines why, despite the free speech im-
plications of communications privacy, First Amendment challenges to 
bulk communications metadata collection programs are even more 
likely to fail than those based on the Fourth. 
III.  COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
If the privacy interests of ordinary, law-abiding Americans in their 
communications records are inadequately protected from incidental 
collection by the Fourth Amendment thanks to Smith v. Maryland189 
and the third party doctrine,190 can a case be made that bulk collec-
tion of communications metadata by the government violates the 
First Amendment?  After all, our ability to contact whomever we 
 
186 Mosman opinion, supra note 184, at 19. 
187 Standing doctrine provides that litigants cannot bring constitutional challenges without 
demonstrating that they have suffered an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and ac-
tual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable 
ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010) (citing 
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)).  See infra notes 280–98 and accompanying 
text. 
188 See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
189 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 141–86. 
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please (including family and friends who live abroad) without con-
currently notifying Big Brother would seem to be part of our freedom 
of speech that the government may not abridge.  People use email 
and the telephone to arrange meetings and make plans; to order and 
inquire about products and services; to ask, answer, and discuss ques-
tions regarding personal, political, religious, and professional mat-
ters; to seek and offer information and advice; and to share news, 
thoughts, feelings, opinions, and beliefs with others.  If communica-
tions metadata is so revealing that the NSA, under EO 12333, taps In-
ternet cables to collect it in hopes of someday identifying possible 
terrorists and their accomplices, must that metadata not also be re-
vealing enough to implicate the First Amendment? 
Scholars have often called for recognition of a First Amendment 
right to object to government surveillance.  Professor Jack Balkin, for 
example, has warned of the threat to free speech posed by what he 
calls “new school censorship”—when the government inserts back-
doors and surveillance technologies into privately owned communi-
cation networks, which then provide the government with the ability 
to access our digital lives.191  Professor Neil Richards has argued that 
government surveillance poses a threat to First Amendment freedom 
of thought and private consultation that make up our right to “intel-
lectual privacy.”192  More generally, Professor Daniel Solove has pro-
posed that the First Amendment be recognized as an independent 
source of criminal procedural protections beyond those afforded by 
the Fourth Amendment.  In particular, he has called for courts to 
fashion a First Amendment right against intrusive government infor-
mation-gathering programs that implicate expressive or associational 
activities and are not narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial gov-
ernment interest.193 
Taking yet another tack, Matthew Lynch has suggested that, in the 
surveillance context, a speaker’s choice of audience should be con-
sidered a form of speech that warrants First Amendment protection 
from government interference.194  Even our former-constitutional-law-
professor President has conceded the connection between govern-
ment surveillance and free expression.  When asked in December 
 
191 Balkin, supra note 122, at 127–30 (warning against government insertion of backdoors 
into privately owned communication networks). 
192 Richards, supra note 23, at 1935–36. 
193 Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 159–60 
(2007). 
194 Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole:  The Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and 
the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST. AMEND. L. REV. 234, 298–300 (2007). 
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2013 about the NSA surveillance programs, President Obama 
acknowledged the importance of communications privacy as a com-
ponent part of “our First Amendment rights and expectations in this 
country.”195 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that laws protecting con-
versational privacy advance an important First Amendment interest in 
facilitating private speech.  In Bartnicki v. Vopper,196 the Court held 
that media outlets that publicly disseminated the contents of an ille-
gally intercepted cell phone call could not be punished under federal 
or state eavesdropping statutes given that (1) those outlets had not 
participated in the illegal interception; and (2) the call pertained to a 
matter of public concern.197  Although six Justices concluded that the 
media’s First Amendment right to broadcast newsworthy information 
outweighed the speakers’ right to privacy in this instance, all nine Jus-
tices recognized the symbiotic relationship between conversational 
privacy and the willingness of individuals to engage in constitutionally 
protected speech.198  Both the majority and the dissent emphasized 
that actual surveillance need not take place to chill private speech; 
the mere possibility that one’s conversations may be monitored can 
have a significant speech-inhibiting effect.199  Bartnicki indicates that 
 
195 HARDBALL (NBC television broadcast Dec. 5, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/53755285/ns/msnbc-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/
 hardball-chris-matthews-thursday-december-th/#.VIRgfDHF98E). 
196 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
197 Id. at 534–35. 
198 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described the case as presenting “a conflict be-
tween interests of the highest order—on the one hand, the interest in full and free dis-
semination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest 
in individual privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.”  Id. at 518.  Jus-
tice Breyer, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice O’Connor, described the compet-
ing interests at stake as “media freedom” on one side and “personal, speech-related priva-
cy” on the other. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
   The dissenting Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, would have given even more 
weight to the First Amendment rights of cell-phone-using Americans to keep their com-
munications private.  The Chief Justice reproached the majority for overemphasizing the 
First Amendment rights of the media while jeopardizing those of ordinary citizens.  Id. at 
542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  Noting that, in 2001, approximately 49 million cellular 
telephones were in use, the Chief Justice concluded that “the chilling effect of the Court’s 
decision upon these private conversations will surely be great.”  Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
199 The majority and dissent both quoted with approval the following paragraph from the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: 
In a democratic society, privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to 
think and act creatively and constructively.  Fear or suspicion that one’s speech is 
being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a 
seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive 
ideas. 
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government interference with electronic communications privacy 
should be open to challenge on First, as well as Fourth, Amendment 
grounds. 
A.  The Content/Metadata Distinction and the First Amendment 
In Bartnicki, the Court recognized the First Amendment value of 
conversational privacy where the contents of a private phone call had 
been intercepted and subsequently broadcast by the news media.  
Bulk metadata collection, conversely, does not involve the capture of 
communications content; rather, the government vacuums up email 
and call detail records, collecting the email addresses with which we 
are in contact, as well as the date, time, duration, and numbers we di-
al and from which we receive calls.  In justifying the NSA’s former 
Section 215 program, the Obama Administration and other support-
ers relied extensively on the “it’s just metadata” argument to assure 
the American people that it comported with both the First and 
Fourth Amendments.200  The one lower court to rule on a First 
Amendment challenge to the former Section 215 program rejected it, 
citing Ninth Circuit decisions that upheld under the First and Fourth 
Amendments the recording by postal workers of envelope infor-
mation from an individual’s incoming mail.201  Unless the contents of 
our conversations are seized by the government, this argument goes, 
any First Amendment right to conversational privacy that may exist 
has not been compromised. 
Well before the advent of electronic databases and computer ana-
lytics, Justice Stewart pinpointed the flaw in this argument.  Dissent-
ing in Smith v. Maryland, he observed that a simple list of numbers di-
aled by one telephone customer will inevitably disclose substantive 
information about the content of those calls:  it reveals the identities 
of persons and organizations that the individual attempted to con-
tact.202  Common sense tells us that Justice Stewart was correct:  the 
 
  Id. at 533; id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
200 See, e.g., John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Pro-
grams, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 908 (2014) (stating that “[t]here can be no First 
Amendment violation if the content of the calls remains untouched”); ADMIN. WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 29, at 21 (emphasizing that the NSA did not collect call content under 
the former Section 215 program, and arguing that it did not violate the First Amend-
ment). 
201 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 785 
F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 
1967); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 760 (9th Cir. 1967)). 
202 442 U.S. 735, 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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gist of a call can often be inferred simply by knowing to whom the 
call is made.  The fact that an individual placed even one call or 
email to a domestic violence hotline (or a phone sex number) reveals 
information that the caller may well prefer remain private.203  Two 
Stanford researchers demonstrated this obvious conclusion in a 2014 
study where they collected three months’ worth of metadata from the 
smartphones of 546 volunteers.204  Just by looking at isolated numbers 
dialed by study participants, the researchers were able to surmise in-
timate details regarding the participants’ personal lives: 
Participants had calls with Alcoholics Anonymous, gun stores, NARAL 
Pro-Choice, labor unions, divorce lawyers, sexually transmitted disease 
clinics, a Canadian import pharmacy, strip clubs, and much more.  This 
was not a hypothetical parade of horribles.  These were simple infer-
ences, about real phone users, that could trivially be made on a large 
scale.205 
When the government collects not only the participating phone 
numbers associated with a call, but the time and duration of those 
calls (as it does with respect to phone records under EO 12333),206 
the ability to make inferences about conversation content becomes 
even more pronounced.  One need not be an intelligence analyst to 
glean information from the fact that a person placed a two-hour call 
to a crisis counseling center at midnight followed by a five-minute call 
to a psychiatrist’s office the next morning.  Again, in the Stanford 
study mentioned above, a mere three months worth of phone 
metadata allowed researchers to piece together calling patterns that 
offered revealing glimpses of their subjects’ private lives.207  Given the 
 
203 Computer science and public affairs professor Edward W. Felten has observed that with 
respect to calls to “single-purpose” numbers such as hotlines for rape, domestic violence 
or addiction, “metadata is often a proxy for content.”  Hearing on Continued Oversight of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 
18 (2013) (written testimony of Edward W. Felten, Professor of Computer Sci. & Pub. Af-
fairs, Princeton Univ.), http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/testimony-2013-10-02.pdf. 
204 Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone:  The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, WEB 
POLICY (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-
telephone-metadata/. 
205 Id. 
206 See SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 2(a) (defining telephony metadata to include “the tele-
phone number of the calling party, the telephone number of the called party, and the 
date, time, and duration of the call”). 
207 Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 204.  For example, one study participant phoned “multiple 
local neurology groups, a specialty pharmacy, a rare condition management service, and 
a hotline for a pharmaceutical used solely to treat relapsing multiple sclerosis.”  Id.  An-
other, within a three-week period, called “a home improvement store, locksmiths, a hy-
droponics dealer, and a head shop.”  Id. A third subject spoke at length with her sister be-
fore making multiple calls to her local Planned Parenthood office. Id.  These were 
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revealing nature of these metadata exchanges, the researchers elect-
ed not to contact the participants to confirm the substance of their 
calls.  Their conclusion, however, was straightforward:  “phone 
metadata is highly sensitive.”208 
Bulk incidental collection under EO 12333 involves government 
collection of email and telephony metadata on a much grander scale 
than the simple pen register information found objectionable by Jus-
tice Stewart back in 1979, or the comparatively tiny dataset examined 
in the Stanford study referenced above.  Today’s bulk surveillance 
programs allow the government to collect and store enormous quan-
tities of its citizens’ communications metadata in the aggregate and 
over multiple years for the purpose of subjecting that dataset to high-
speed digital analysis.209  Unsurprisingly, it is actually much cheaper 
and easier for the government to analyze metadata using advanced 
computer technology than it would be to have thousands of intelli-
gence agents listening to millions of individual calls.210  Even the for-
mer general counsel of the NSA has admitted that “[m]etadata abso-
lutely tells you everything about somebody’s life . . . .  If you have 
enough metadata you don’t really need content.”211 
In the context of the former Section 215 program, supporters re-
sponded that any fears regarding the revealing nature of metadata 
were overblown given that the NSA collected only telephone num-
bers without the corresponding subscriber identities212—an argument 
that could also be applied to incidental bulk collection and analysis 
under EO 12333.  In both instances, however, the conclusion that this 
 
followed by brief calls to Planned Parenthood two weeks later, and one final call to 
Planned Parenthood at the four-week mark.  Id. 
208 Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 204. 
209 See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
210 But see Dan Froomkin, The Computers are Listening:  Speech Recognition is NSA’s Best-Kept Open 
Secret, INTERCEPT (May 11, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/05/11/speech-
recognition-nsa-best-kept-secret/ (describing an NSA program that automatically converts 
spoken content of telephone calls into searchable phonetic transcripts). 
211 Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 21, 2013 
(quoting Stewart Baker), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/ nov/21/
snowden-leaks-and-public/. 
212 See Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with Metadata?, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2013 (describing 
Senator Diane Feinstein’s defense of the former Section 215 program as emphasizing 
that the NSA collects only phone numbers, not names); see also Ryan McDonald, NSA Di-
rector Keith Alexander Defends Data Collection During Baltimore Visit, BALTIMORE BUS. J., Oct. 
31, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/blog/cyberbizblog/2013/10/nsa-
director-keith-alexander-defends.html (reporting that the NSA Director responded to 
concerns about the former Section 215 program by noting that the agency does not col-
lect caller identities). 
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renders the metadata anonymous is simply wrong.213  Most of us have 
employed publicly available databases to match phone numbers to a 
name.  Given the myriad resources available to the NSA, it must be 
child’s play for such a sophisticated intelligence agency to do the 
same.  If the NSA truly were incapable of determining someone’s 
identity from a phone number, it would be nonsensical for the agen-
cy to collect call detail records in the first place.  Most email metadata 
collected under EO 12333, which include the Internet-protocol ad-
dress of the computer from which an email was sent, as well as log-in 
information pertaining to web-based email accounts, are also easily 
identifiable.214  As an example, consider former CIA Director David 
Petraeus, who learned this the hard way after the FBI used email 
metadata to link a pseudonymous email account to his mistress.215 
All in all, then, communications metadata is powerful stuff.  The 
fact that the government subjects incidentally collected domestic 
metadata, rather than communications content, to unlimited analysis 
under EO 12333 should not foreclose further First Amendment scru-
tiny. 
B.  Is the Chilling Effect Real? 
Given the revealing nature of communications metadata, inci-
dental government collection of domestic email and call records un-
der the guise of foreign collection could pose a threat to our First 
Amendment freedoms by discouraging citizens from speaking frankly 
or associating with those whom the government might view with sus-
picion or disdain.  Scholars have argued that government surveillance 
strips us of the privacy we need to generate new ideas, to test poten-
tially controversial or unpopular views, and to develop our beliefs by 
sharing them openly with trusted others.216  Simple awareness that the 
 
213 For a discussion of how easily “anonymized” datasets can be re-identified, see Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy:  Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1701, 1703–04 (2010) (concluding that, because of advances in re-identification sci-
ence, “[d]ata can be either useful or perfectly anonymous, but never both”). 
214 See SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 2(b). 
215 See Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Officials Say F.B.I. Knew of Petraeus Affair in the Summer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at A1 (detailing the F.B.I.’s use of metadata to ascertain an e-
mail author’s identity in the investigation of David Patraeus). 
216 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect:  First Amendment Impli-
cations of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2015) (conclud-
ing that government surveillance discourages the cultivation of minority viewpoints and 
limits individual autonomy); Richards, supra note 23, at 1935 (stating that government 
surveillance of intellectual activity, such as communicating with others about political and 
social issues, can discourage experimentation with “new, controversial, or deviant ideas”). 
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government collects, stores and analyzes our communications 
metadata may make us less likely to communicate, or associate, with 
others freely and without fear. 
In general, social science research confirms the logical conclusion 
that we act differently when we know, or even suspect, that we are be-
ing observed.217  This is the reason why closed-circuit television cam-
eras have been installed in public streets, transit systems and busi-
nesses around the world.  Film footage from surveillance cameras 
may assist law enforcement in solving crimes, but the mere presence 
of cameras also tends to reduce criminal conduct in the first in-
stance.218  Similarly, some cities have installed cameras at intersections 
not only to detect but also to deter drivers from running red lights.219  
These examples show how we often conform our behavior in accord-
ance with social norms when we think we are being watched, even 
when the only “watcher” is a machine. 
Apologists for the former Section 215 program claim that when 
the government gathers our metadata, it is merely collecting infor-
mation that we already have provided, willingly, to third party service 
providers.220  Speakers who really believe that metadata collection 
constrains their expressive freedom, the argument goes, would have 
refused to share their metadata with the telephone company or their 
Internet service provider in the first place.  Even overlooking the ut-
 
217 For example, social scientists found that displaying signs with the message “Cycle Thieves, 
We Are Watching You” at bike racks on a university campus decreased bicycle thefts at 
those locations by 62% over a twelve-month period.  Daniel Nettle, Kenneth Nott & 
Melissa Bateson, ‘Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You’:  Impact of a Simple Signage Intervention 
Against Bicycle Theft, PLOS ONE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://journals.plos. org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0051738; see also Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 216, at 
489–93 (listing and describing additional surveillance-related studies). 
218 See, e.g., NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., EVALUATING THE USE 
OF PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 87 (2011), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412403-Evaluating-
the-Use-of-Public-Surveillance-Cameras-for-Crime-Control-and-Prevention.PDF (conclud-
ing that surveillance cameras, when actively monitored and properly placed, can reduce 
crime). 
219 Based on figures comparing the number of collisions in Seattle during the three years 
before and after the city installed red-light cameras, the Seattle Department of Transpor-
tation found that collisions decreased by about 23% , and collisions involving pedestrians 
declined by almost one-third. Will Green, Seattle’s Red Light Cameras Reduce Collisions by 
23%, URBANIST (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.theurbanist.org/2015/01/23/a-look-at-
seattles-red-light-cameras/. 
220 For instance, at a 2013 debate sponsored by Intelligence Squared U.S., ex-NSA general 
counsel Stewart Baker described the former Section 215 program not as “spying on eve-
rybody,” but rather as “gathering data that is already in the hands of third parties.”  Intel-
ligence Squared U.S., Spy On Me, I’d Rather Be Safe, (Nov. 20, 2013), 12–13, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/200404032/Spy-on-Me-I-d-Rather-Be-Safe-Transcript. 
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ter impossibility of surviving in today’s world without communica-
tions devices that, of necessity, create metadata,221 this contention as-
sumes that sharing data with a business is no different from providing 
it to the government, with its singular power to prosecute, investigate 
and punish.222  In her United States v. Jones concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor charged that “[a]wareness that the Government may be 
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”223  The Presi-
dent’s Review Group quoted Justice Sotomayor to explain its recom-
mendation that Congress terminate the former Section 215 program, 
adding that public trust in government is seriously weakened when 
citizens know that the government can access their communications 
metadata with “one flick of a switch.”224 
Neither Justice Sotomayor nor the President’s Review Group, 
however, cited any empirical support for the conclusion that gov-
ernment surveillance deters speech or association.  This is under-
standable; scholars have often noted the difficulties associated with 
demonstrating the existence of a chilling effect.225  Nevertheless, since 
the Snowden revelations in 2013, various surveys have suggested that 
Americans are extremely concerned about government surveillance, 
which has caused us to doubt our ability to communicate privately, 
and had at least some effect on our communications behavior.  Ac-
cording to a 2014 Pew Research Center study, almost 80% of those 
surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that “Americans should be con-
cerned about the government’s monitoring of phone calls and inter-
net communications.”226  More importantly, the study found that most 
of those surveyed had lost confidence in the privacy of their electron-
 
221 Back in 2010, the Court recognized the growing importance of cell phones, stating in City 
of Ontario v. Quon that “[c]ell phone and text message communications are so pervasive 
that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for 
self-expression, even self-identification.” 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010). 
222 See Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance 
Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 112 (explaining that sharing information with the gov-
ernment is a “different proposition all together [sic]” than sharing that same information 
with a private company). 
223 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  See also supra 
notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
224 PRG Report, supra note 85, at 117. 
225 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 
1675 (2013) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to establish either the presence or absence of a 
chilling effect, let alone to measure the extent of such an effect”); Frederick Schauer, 
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:  Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 BOSTON U. L. REV. 685, 
730 (1978) (stating that as specific predictions about human behavior, chilling effects are 
probably “unprovable”). 
226 Pew 2014 Study, supra note 1, at 22. 
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ic conversations, whether made via landline phones, cell phones, text 
messaging, instant messaging, email, or social media messaging.227 
Other studies have focused on the chilling effect of surveillance 
on writers and members of the press.  Journalists depend on the tele-
phone and digital devices to gather newsworthy information, some-
times from sources who insist on remaining nameless.  Those sources 
may be unwilling to communicate by phone or email if they believe 
that any promise of confidentiality is rendered meaningless by the 
government’s ability to collect and scrutinize their communications 
metadata.228  A 2013 PEN America survey of 528 writers/editors found 
that 76% of respondents believe that government surveillance pro-
grams invade the privacy they needed to be creative; as a result, 24% 
of respondents reported avoiding certain topics when communi-
cating by telephone or email, and 16% said they had limited the top-
ics upon which they wrote or spoke for fear that the government was 
monitoring their communications.229  A smaller 2014 ACLU/Human 
Rights Watch study of U.S. journalists who cover national security is-
sues detailed how the combination of NSA surveillance plus the in-
creased number of prosecutions against government leakers has 
dried up sources and made information-gathering much more diffi-
 
227 Id. at 23. Unsurprisingly, the more survey respondents knew about government surveil-
lance programs, the less confident they were in their ability to communicate personal in-
formation in a confidential manner.  Id. 
   A follow-up Pew survey in 2015 reported that of the 87%  of adults who were familiar 
with bulk surveillance programs, 34% (30% of all adults) had “taken at least one step to 
hide or shield their information from the government.”  Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, 
Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RESEARCH CTR., Mar. 16, 2015, at 3.  Within 
that group, 14% said they had spoken more in person rather than communicating over 
the telephone or online; 13%  reported avoiding using certain terms when communi-
cating online; and 11% had not used terms they thought might attract government atten-
tion when using internet search engines.  Id. at 19. 
228 Justice Stewart recognized that confidentiality is essential to newsgathering in his dissent 
in Branzburg v. Hayes, where he wrote that “when neither the reporter nor his source can 
rely on the shield of confidentiality against unrestrained use of [governmental] power, 
valuable information will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be im-
poverished.” 408 U.S. 665, 736 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  See also infra notes 314–17 
and accompanying text; Ross Coulthart, Metadata Access is Putting Whistleblowers, Journalists 
and Democracy at Risk, BRISBANE TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/
comment/metadata-access-is-putting-whistleblowers-journalists-and-democracy-at-risk-
20150504-1mzfi0.html (describing how an Australian official obtained a journalist’s pri-
vate phone records, to demonstrate how easily those records revealed the identity of the 
journalist’s confidential sources). 
229 PEN American Ctr., Chilling Effects:  NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor (Nov. 
12, 2013), https://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/ Chilling% 20Effects_PEN%20
American.pdf. 
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cult.230  Participating journalists indicated that government surveil-
lance “constrains their ability to investigate and report on matters of 
public concern, and ultimately undermines democratic processes by 
hindering open, informed debate.”231 
In its report on the former Section 215 program, the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”)232 concluded that gov-
ernment collection of telephony metadata created a chilling effect 
that not only weakens our free press but also discourages citizen par-
ticipation in political, religious and other organizations.233  As proof, 
the PCLOB described how groups ranging from Greenpeace to the 
National Rifle Association supported legal challenges to the program 
on the grounds that metadata collection has prevented them from 
communicating freely with members, contributors, politicians, and 
others.234  In one such lawsuit, twenty-two diverse advocacy organiza-
tions filed affidavits detailing how, after the Snowden revelations, 
they experienced a drop in telephone communications from mem-
bers, whistleblowers, clients, and others.235  Empirical studies of other 
instances of government surveillance have demonstrated that it can 
change behavior in ways that diminish the effectiveness of religious or 
political organizations and social movements.236 
 
230 Am. Civil Liberties Union & Human Rights Watch, With Liberty to Monitor All:  How Large-
Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy 22, 24–26 (July 28, 
2014), https://www.aclu.org/report/liberty-monitor-all-how-large-scale-us-surveillance-
harming-journalism-law-and-american. 
231 Id. at 24. 
232 The PCLOB is an independent, bipartisan executive branch agency that was authorized, 
as currently structured, by Congress in 2007.  See About the Board, PRIVACY & CIVIL 
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) 
(providing a broad overview of the PCLOB’s authority, responsibilities, and history).  Its 
mission is “to ensure that the federal government’s efforts to prevent terrorism are bal-
anced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties.” PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES 
OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/about-us.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).  For a 
discussion of the board’s troubled history and how its lack of staffing could limit its over-
all effectiveness, see Dalal, supra note 222, at 121–23. 
233 PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 162. 
234 Id. at 164. 
235 The affidavits in the lawsuit, First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, Civ. No. 13-
3287 (N.D. Cal.) (complaint filed July 16, 2013) are available at https://www.eff.org/
 document/all-plaintiffs-declarations. 
236 See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in 
Counterterrorism Policing:  A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV., 365, 396 
(2010) (finding that 20% of surveyed Muslim-Americans reported lower mosque attend-
ance in response to increased law enforcement scrutiny of Muslims). 
   Another study of seventy-one social justice organizations found that government sur-
veillance caused them to engage in self-censorship, and deprived them of members, do-
nations, and access to space in which to share ideas.  Amory Starr, et al., The Impacts of 
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While these polls, studies, and reports provide support for the ex-
istence of a chilling effect attached to government collection of 
communications metadata, some might fault the evidence for being 
overly anecdotal and conclusory, or for taking inadequate account of 
multiple causes for behavioral changes.  Skeptics might point out that 
during the year following the Snowden revelations, Americans may 
not have trusted their cell phones, but they certainly continued to use 
them.237 
More importantly, all the studies mentioned in this Part were 
conducted before Congress passed the Freedom Act, which, as de-
scribed in Part I, imposed some limits on the NSA’s surveillance activ-
ities under FISA but had no effect on similar activities under EO 
12333.  The fanfare accompanying the Freedom Act’s passage may 
well have convinced some Americans that their communications rec-
ords would no longer reside in NSA databases.  Consider as well that 
NSA intelligence gathering under EO 12333 is veiled in secrecy, mak-
ing it a safe bet that most Americans know little about how the NSA 
captures and analyzes American metadata as part of its foreign intel-
ligence mandate.  While the Snowden leaks forced the government to 
admit that the NSA collected almost all of our domestic call detail 
records under the former Section 215 program, the government has 
remained silent about the scope of incidental collection of American 
communications metadata under EO 12333.238  A government surveil-
lance program regarding which most Americans remain entirely ig-
norant—despite efforts by NSA whistleblower John Napier Tye to ed-
ucate the public described in Part I239—seems unlikely to exert a 
major chilling effect on protected speech. 
Studies to date, then, establish that revelations about government 
surveillance programs in general have created anxiety among many 
Americans regarding the privacy of their communications.  Fear re-
garding this lack of privacy can hinder the operation of our free 
press, undermine our trust in government, and cause us to second-
guess what we say and with whom we associate.  Nevertheless, it may 
be impossible to demonstrate, and implausible to believe, that NSA 
 
State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association:  A Socio-Legal Analysis, 31 QUALITATIVE 
SOC. 251, 267–68 (2008). 
237 In the last quarter of 2014, the nation’s four largest wireless communications service pro-
viders gained between almost a million to two million new subscribers. See Dennis 
Bournique, Fourth Quarter 2014 Prepaid Mobile Subscriber Numbers By Operator, PREPAID 
PHONE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.prepaidphonenews.com/2015/02/ fouth-
quarter-2014-prepaid-mobile.html. 
238 See infra notes 401–05 and accompanying text. 
239 See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
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collection and analysis of American communications metadata under 
EO 12333 in particular has any untoward effect on First Amendment 
activities, given that most Americans are unaware of EO 12333’s ex-
istence.  While the Supreme Court has, on occasion, invalidated laws 
in part based on their purported chilling effects without much in the 
way of evidence to back up its assumptions,240 whether the Court 
would be willing to engage in imaginative speculation in this instance 
would be, at best, a long shot. 
C.  If a Chilling Effect Exists, Is It Legally Cognizable under the First 
Amendment? 
Even assuming that government surveillance under EO 12333 re-
sults in a discernible chilling effect on citizens’ First Amendment ac-
tivities, the mere existence of a chilling effect on speech or associa-
tion, by itself, will be insufficient to support a First Amendment 
claim.241  Much of government regulation is meant to deter citizens 
from engaging in certain proscribable acts by imposing criminal pun-
ishments or civil liability.  This natural and expected result is not con-
stitutionally problematic; it constitutes what Frederick Schauer has 
described as a “benign chilling effect—an effect caused by the inten-
tional regulation of speech or activity properly subject to government 
control.”242  The fear of being issued a traffic ticket helps ensure that I 
obey the speed limit.  In the speech context, the threat of civil liabil-
ity under state libel law is meant to discourage the press from know-
ingly or recklessly publishing defamatory falsehoods about local offi-
cials.  In this context, libel law restricts a newspaper’s ability to 
publish speech it knows or should know is false, but properly so; de-
famatory speech in these circumstances can be punished under exist-
ing First Amendment doctrine.243 
A chilling effect becomes constitutionally suspect, or, in Professor 
Schauer’s lexicon, “invidious,” when otherwise proper government 
 
240 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the Court had provided no evidence to conclude that the threat of libel suits 
brought by private citizens would deter truthful news coverage); Kendrick, supra note 
225, at 1656–57 (stating that “[i]n signal areas such as defamation and obscenity, the 
Court has provided no evidence whatsoever to support either its diagnosis of chilling or 
its favored cure,” and citing cases). 
241 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971) (“[T]he existence of a ‘chilling effect,’ even 
in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in 
and of itself, for prohibiting state action.”). 
242 Schauer, supra note 225, at 690. 
243 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (listing defamation as a catego-
ry of speech that can be regulated under the First Amendment). 
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regulation has the indirect consequence of discouraging expression 
that falls within the zone of First Amendment protection because the 
speaker fears punishment or other adverse consequence.244  Given the 
unavoidable uncertainties and costs of both litigation and legal com-
pliance, a would-be speaker may choose to remain silent rather than 
expose herself to potential criminal prosecution,245 civil liability,246 in-
creased costs,247 retaliation,248 or loss of a government benefit.249  For 
example, the same libel laws that serve to protect individual reputa-
tions may also cause risk-averse publishers to err on the side of cau-
tion, with the result that truthful matters of public importance re-
main unexpressed.  The Court’s landmark decision of New York Times 
v. Sullivan250 reflects a policy determination that a democratic society 
is better served by legal rules that encourage free debate even at the 
cost of overprotecting some defamatory falsehoods.251 
Even with respect to invidious chilling effects, however, not every 
law or government activity that somehow discourages constitutionally 
protected speech will be found to violate the First Amendment.  In 
cases where laws or regulatory programs have been invalidated be-
cause they have a chilling effect on speech, those laws have imposed 
some type of punishment, sanction or threat of reprisal on the speak-
er.  The government must have done something that could harm an 
individual because of her protected speech.252  So, for example, in 
Sullivan, the state libel law chilled expression by subjecting speakers 
 
244 Schauer, supra note 225, at 693. 
245 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152–54 (1959) (invalidating a city ordinance 
that made booksellers criminally liable for unknowing possession of obscene materials). 
246 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (finding that the fear of 
civil damage awards “may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution un-
der a criminal statute”). 
247 See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974) (invalidating a statute that 
required newspaper editors to provide political candidates with space to respond to pub-
lished criticisms). 
248 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486–89 (1965) (finding that repeated label-
ing by state officials of an organization as “subversive,” plus state seizures of the groups’ 
records, scared off potential members and contributors). 
249 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958) (invalidating a state law that de-
nied property tax exemption to veterans who refused to sign a loyalty oath, stating that 
“to deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to 
penalize them for such speech”). 
250 376 U.S. at 279–80 (1964) (holding that to prevail in a libel action, public officials must 
prove that false statements regarding their official conduct were published with either 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). 
251 Id. at 271–72. 
252 In the Court’s words, government actions create an unconstitutional chilling effect only 
when those actions are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.”  Laird v. Ta-
tum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). 
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to the risk of civil liability.  Similarly, in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a 
state right of reply statute was found to violate the First Amendment 
because it forced newspapers to pay the costs, in space, paper, and 
ink, of printing a response to previously published political commen-
tary.253  Rather than subsidize someone else’s speech, the Court con-
cluded, some editors would simply refuse to publish controversial po-
litical opinions altogether.254  The actionable chilling effect resulted 
from an unconstitutional ultimatum:  any editor who chose to express 
a political opinion could be required to finance someone else’s point 
of view. 
Conversely, valid government rules and regulations of general ap-
plicability frequently operate to chill even our protected speech in a 
way that courts view as merely incidental.  For example, the presence 
of airport security may keep me from making jokes about terrorism at 
the airport, yet we would all agree that the screeners’ presence is not 
constitutionally problematic.  In these cases, courts balance the im-
portance of the state interest advanced by the law or regulatory pro-
gram against the magnitude of the chilling effect on expressive activi-
ties.255  The Court’s decision in Branzburg v Hayes,256 a case involving 
the general duty of all citizens to testify regarding their knowledge of 
criminal activities, is a good example of this approach.  There, the 
Court refused to grant reporters a special First Amendment right to 
refuse to testify before grand juries regarding information provided 
to them by confidential sources, finding that any deterrent effect on 
the willingness of sources to speak with the press was both uncertain 
and outweighed by government’s countervailing interest in protect-
ing public safety.257  Only if it could be shown that the government 
convened a grand jury in bad faith to harass or intimidate a particular 
journalist, rather than to fight crime, did the Court indicate that the 
First Amendment would require a different result.258 
Applying these principles to secret government surveillance pro-
grams demonstrates why a stand-alone First Amendment claim based 
on chilling effects is unlikely to succeed.  When the NSA passively col-
 
253 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974). 
254 Id. at 257. 
255 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971) (“Where a statute does not directly 
abridge free speech, but—while regulating a subject within the State’s power—tends to 
have the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the 
statute can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control 
of the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so.”). 
256   408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
257 Id. at 690–91. 
258 Id. at 707–08. 
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lects communications metadata under EO 12333, the agency neither 
prohibits any speech nor imposes any punishment on those who en-
gage in lawful communications.  Absent abuse, metadata collection 
carries no consequence other than the possibility of further investiga-
tion should analysis reveal that a U.S. person is in contact with a sus-
pected terrorist.  Like Branzburg’s requirement that every citizen pro-
vide his or her testimony in a criminal case, then, the NSA’s bulk 
collection of communications metadata under EO 12333 is a pro-
gram of general applicability,259 and the program’s effect on speech 
will be deemed incidental.260  The balance of interests cannot help 
but favor the government, given that foreign-intelligence-gathering 
activities serve to keep the nation safe from foreign terrorism, a state 
interest of the highest order.261  This fundamental state interest can-
not be outweighed given that—thanks in large part to government 
secrecy surrounding the program—the amount of speech chilled by 
the existence of EO 12333 collection is uncertain at best, and, most 
likely, insignificant. 
A First Amendment challenge to government surveillance based 
on its chilling effect on freedom of association would seem to provide 
a stronger basis to oppose NSA surveillance under EO 12333.  After 
all, the whole purpose of collecting communications metadata and 
subjecting it to potentially unlimited contact chaining under 
SPCMA262 is to give the NSA the ability to map social connections 
among correspondents so it can look for potential terrorists and their 
collaborators.263  More than fifty years ago, the Court in NAACP v. Al-
abama held that the state could not force the NAACP to comply with 
a disclosure order to provide its membership list to state officials, be-
cause to do so would violate NAACP members’ right to associate to 
advance their opinions and beliefs.264  Compelled identification of 
 
259 As described in Part I, EO 12333 collection falls outside of the FISA warrant requirements 
for the very reason that the NSA does not target specific Americans when it engages in 
vacuum-cleaner-style foreign-based surveillance.  See supra Part I.  By the same token, un-
targeted collection of communications metadata would, by definition, fall outside the bad 
faith exception identified in Branzburg.  408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972). 
260 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611–13 (1985) (finding that government policy 
of prosecuting those draft resisters who self-reported their failure to register imposed an 
incidental burden on speech that was justified by the important interest in effective en-
forcement of the draft laws). 
261 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”). 
262 See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
263 See Strandburg, supra note 24, at 327–28 (describing the goal of comprehensive metadata 
collection as “relational surveillance”). 
264 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
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group members, while not directly stifling speech, could thwart an 
organization’s ability to attract and retain members, especially when a 
group promotes controversial or unpopular views.265 
While the Court noted that the right to privacy of group associa-
tion is not absolute, it concluded that the disclosure order in these 
facts amounted to a “substantial restraint” on group members’ free-
dom of association.266  This was so, the Court emphasized, because the 
NAACP had produced strong evidence that, in the past, its members 
had been subjected to threats of “economic reprisal, loss of employ-
ment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public 
hostility.”267  On the other side of the balance, the Court found that 
the state had failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the membership 
list substantially advanced its asserted state interest in determining 
whether the NAACP had complied with Alabama’s foreign corpora-
tion registration statute.268 
One obvious difference between NAACP and NSA collection of 
communications metadata is that the NSA compels no organization 
to reveal its adherents; rather, the NSA has itself gathered the com-
munications metadata from which it infers a target’s social connec-
tions.  In that sense, the government’s collection and analysis of 
metadata could be characterized as an independent investigation, 
similar to what in the old days would have required the FBI to send a 
bevy of agents to follow suspected terrorists and monitor their inter-
actions with others.  Viewed this way, the government could avoid 
NCAAP’s holding by taking advantage of technological advances that 
allow it to compile membership lists without having to ask for them.  
Whether this should make a constitutional difference is doubtful.  As 
Professor Katherine Strandburg has observed with respect to the 
former Section 215 program, “[t]he fact that associational infor-
mation must be inferred from the metadata rather than merely read 
from a list does little to limit the program’s potential to chill associa-
tional activity.”269 
A more significant distinction is the fact that the chilling effect on 
association recognized by the Court in NAACP resulted from the very 
real likelihood of reprisals against group members should their iden-
 
265 Id. at 462. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 464–65. 
269 Strandburg, supra note 24, at 359. 
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tities be revealed.270  Not only did the disclosure order target the 
NCAAP directly, the organization had shown past instances where 
members, once identified as such, lost their jobs, were physically 
threatened, and suffered other economic and social harms.271  In later 
cases, the Court has required those resisting disclosure requirements 
on the grounds of associational privacy to show “a reasonable proba-
bility that the compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to threats, 
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private 
parties.”272  In Doe v. Reed, for example, the Court rejected a facial 
challenge to a state public records act provision that required state 
officials to provide on request copies of referendum petitions con-
taining the signers’ names and addresses.273  Although the petition 
signers alleged that disclosure would expose them to harassment and 
intimidation by groups with opposing political views, the Court found 
that the signers had provided insufficient evidence to support their 
fears.274 
Based on our admittedly limited knowledge, NSA collection of 
communications metadata under EO 12333 targets no U.S. persons, 
imposes no punishments, and inflicts no tangible harms (except, 
perhaps, on terrorists and their associates).  While those few Ameri-
cans who are aware of NSA surveillance under EO 12333 may be less 
likely to communicate with foreigners or join dissident organizations, 
this hardly equals the campaign of harassment suffered by NAACP 
members in Alabama during the 1950s.  As a result, courts are unlike-
ly to view the NSA’s passive collection of metadata as creating a “seri-
ous burden”275 on Americans’ right of expressive association. 
Finally, while the Court has indicated that restrictions on freedom 
of association must survive “exacting scrutiny,” those restrictions will 
be upheld if they “serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means signifi-
 
270 For a discussion of how the Alabama Citizens’ Councils retaliated against civil rights ad-
vocates in the 1950s, see John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of As-
sociation, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485, 508–10 (2010). 
271 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
272 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 198 (2003)). 
273 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
274 Id. at 199–201.  However, the Court acknowledged the possibility of a future as-applied 
challenge to the law with respect to a particular petition.  Id. at 201. 
275 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658–59 (2000) (noting that “in the associa-
tional freedom cases . . . after finding a compelling state interest, the Court went on to 
examine whether or not the application of the state law would impose any ‘serious bur-
den’ on the organization’s rights of expressive association”). 
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cantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”276  Foreign intelli-
gence gathering, including NSA collection and analysis of communi-
cations metadata, is defended by the government as a means to com-
bat terrorism, an interest described by the Court as “an urgent 
objective of the highest order.”277  Could the government fight terror-
ism as effectively without subjecting our communications metadata to 
indiscriminate collection and analysis?  Given the secrecy surround-
ing EO 12333, it would be impossible for someone without a high-
level security clearance to tell.  It’s worth noting, however, that the 
Court has recently resolved other questions of free speech and asso-
ciation in the national security context by according great deference 
to government claims of necessity,278 a trend that is likely to contin-
ue.279 
D.  The Problem of Standing 
All of this discussion may be academic in the sense that it over-
looks a more fundamental problem:  even if government collection 
and analysis of domestic communications metadata chills speech 
and/or association, will anyone have standing to seek redress in 
court?  Under Article III standing doctrine, to have a justiciable 
claim, a litigant must demonstrate that she has suffered an injury that 
is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable 
to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”280  In 
the surveillance context, the Supreme Court has interpreted the first 
two of these requirements to make it next to impossible for litigants 
to mount a court challenge to secret government surveillance pro-
grams. 
The Court first addressed a challenge to government surveillance 
in Laird v. Tatum,281 where the plaintiffs objected that their First 
Amendment rights had been chilled by the “mere existence” of a U.S. 
 
276 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).  So, for example, the Court has upheld 
federal campaign finance disclosure requirements despite their potential chilling effect 
on would-be donors based on the compelling state interest in informing the electorate 
and countering campaign corruption.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
277 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
278 Id. at 7 (upholding federal law prohibiting provision of “material support or resources” to 
certain terrorist organizations against free speech and free association claims brought by 
human rights organizations). 
279 See Dalal, supra note 222, at 114–16 (describing how courts grant the executive branch a 
type of “super-deference” with respect to national security matters). 
280 Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (citing Horne v. Flores, 
557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)). 
281 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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Army program that compiled information regarding lawful civilian 
political activities thought to present a risk of civil disorder.282  A 5-4 
majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as non-justiciable, holding that 
“allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a 
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm.”283  While the Court in Laird did not reach the merits of the 
First Amendment claim, it emphasized that the plaintiffs had pre-
sented no evidence that the government had engaged in any illegal 
surveillance practices; in fact, most of the information collected by 
Army intelligence agents came from public sources such as the news 
media.284  The Court indicated that its decision might have been dif-
ferent had the government engaged in unlawful conduct, stating that 
nothing in its holding “can properly be seen as giving any indication 
that actual or threatened injury by reasons of unlawful activities of the 
military would go unnoticed or unremedied.”285 
More than forty years later, however, plaintiffs who claimed that a 
secret government surveillance program was unlawful under the First 
and Fourth Amendments, Article III and separation of powers doc-
trine fared no better.  In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,286 the 
Court extended the Laird holding to deny standing to plaintiffs who 
alleged to have suffered both actual and threatened harm from cov-
ert government surveillance conducted under Section 702 of FISA.287  
That program authorizes the NSA to capture communications of 
non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States without a showing of individualized suspicion.288  
However, Section 702 also expands the government’s ability to moni-
tor Americans’ communications, given that U.S. persons who com-
municate with foreigners may also have their private messages “inci-
dentally” collected.289 
The Clapper plaintiffs consisted of U.S. persons whose work as at-
torneys, human rights activists, and journalists required them to 
 
282 Id. at 2, 10. 
283 Id. at 12–14. 
284 Id. at 9. 
285 Id. at 16. 
286 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
287 Id. at 1143. 
288 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a)–(b) (2012) (allowing the AG and the DNI to jointly authorize, for 
the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information, the surveillance of non-U.S. 
persons who are reasonably believed to be located abroad). 
289 For more information about the Section 702 program, including incidental collection of 
communications belonging to or concerning U.S. persons, see the PCLOB Section 702 
Report, supra note 93. 
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communicate by telephone and email with foreigners who were likely 
targets of Section 702 surveillance.290  The plaintiffs argued that, as a 
result of their reasonable fear that their overseas electronic commu-
nications would be intercepted by the NSA, their future ability to 
gather information, develop sources, and communicate privately with 
their clients would be impaired.291  Additionally, they claimed that the 
surveillance threat had already forced them to take “costly and bur-
densome measures,” such overseas travel, to ensure the confidentiali-
ty of their conversations.292 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected these arguments.  First, the 
plaintiffs’ claims of likely future injury were seen by the Court as too 
speculative because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that their 
communications had been or would be, in fact, intercepted by the 
government.293  (Of course, plaintiffs had no way to prove this—
secrecy is, by definition, an essential component of covert govern-
ment surveillance.)  What the plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals, 
saw as an “objectively reasonable likelihood”294 that the plaintiffs’ 
communications would be monitored was, to the Court, nothing 
more than a “speculative chain of possibilities” insufficient to demon-
strate the existence of a “certainly impending” injury.295 
Compounding the plaintiffs’ problems with proof was the fact that 
the government has multiple legal authorities under which it can 
conduct foreign surveillance, including EO 12333.  For plaintiffs to 
survive the traceability prong of the standing test, Justice Alito rea-
soned that plaintiffs would have to demonstrate not only that their 
communications actually had been intercepted by the NSA, but also 
that the interceptions occurred pursuant to Section 702 and not 
some other statutory provision or executive order.296  Even in the rare 
case where a plaintiff could produce actual evidence of covert gov-
ernment surveillance, the existence of overlapping legal authorities 
for intelligence gathering means that a plaintiff may never be able to 
demonstrate conclusively that she was surveilled pursuant to one au-
thority or another. 
 
290 For example, two plaintiffs were attorneys who had represented Guantanamo Bay detain-
ees charged with terrorism.  Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1157–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 1146. 
293 Id. at 1148. 
294 Id. at 1143, 1146 (citing Amnesty Int’l United States v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 133, 134, 
139 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
295 Id. at 1150. 
296 Id. at 1149. 
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Second, Justice Alito also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
they had already suffered a sufficient injury for standing purposes 
given the expenses they had incurred to ensure the privacy of their 
communications.  According to the Court, any economic costs borne 
by the plaintiffs could not fairly be attributed to Section 702 surveil-
lance, but rather were the product of plaintiffs’ own subjective, hypo-
thetical—but admittedly not irrational—fears.297  Justice Alito ex-
pressed concern that a contrary decision would allow the plaintiffs to 
“manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based 
on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly im-
pending.”298  He was apparently less concerned that the Court’s rea-
soning allowed the government to defeat standing simply by keeping 
silent and insisted that the Court’s holding would not insulate Sec-
tion 702 from judicial review.  Because FISA requires that the gov-
ernment provide notice of its intent to use information derived from 
Section 702 in a criminal prosecution, Justice Alito noted that de-
fendants who receive such notice could bring a constitutional chal-
lenge to the statute.299 
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Breyer disputed the Court’s 
finding that the plaintiffs’ future injuries were too speculative, noting 
that Section 702 surveillance of plaintiffs’ communications in these 
facts was “as likely to take place as are most future events that com-
 
297 Id. at 1151 (stating that “[i]f the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be 
able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure 
based on a nonparanoid fear”). 
298 Id. 
299 Under FISA, the government is required to notify defendants when it uses evidence “ob-
tained or derived” from Section 702 surveillance.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1881e(a).  Ironi-
cally, at the time Clapper was argued and decided, the Department of Justice was not 
providing this required notice to criminal defendants, in direct contradiction of assur-
ances given to the Court by the Solicitor General.  See Adam Liptak, A Secret Surveillance 
Program Proves Challengeable in Theory Only, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013, at A11 (explaining 
that despite the solicitor general’s assertions, federal prosecutors refused to make the 
requisite disclosures in criminal prosecutions).  Since that time the government has noti-
fied at least two criminal defendants that evidence had been obtained against them pur-
suant to warrantless surveillance under the Section 702 program.  See Ellen Nakashima, 
Man Convicted in Terrorism Case Seeks Evidence from Warrantless NSA Surveillance, WASH. 
POST, (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/man-
convicted-in-terror-case-challenges-warrantless-spying/2014/01/13/af7da5de-7cba-11e3-
95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html (noting that federal prosecutors notified a defendant in 
Colorado as well as a defendant in Oregon “that evidence from a warrantless wiretap was 
used against [them]”).  One of these defendants brought a constitutional challenge to 
Section 702, which was rejected by a federal district court. See United States v. Mohamud, 
No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *30, *32 (D. Or. June 24, 2014) 
(rejecting defendant’s arguments challenging the constitutionality of Section 702 under 
the First and Fourth Amendments). 
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monsense inferences and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell 
us will happen.”300  This was so, Justice Breyer reasoned, because the 
government had both strong motives as well as the technical ability to 
intercept communications belonging to the plaintiffs’ foreign con-
tacts.301  A “reasonable probability” of harm, not an absolute certainty 
of occurrence, had been required by the Court in past cases and, ac-
cording to Justice Breyer, was the appropriate standard for the Court 
to grant standing in these facts.302 
Commentators were quick to fault Clapper for setting the standing 
barrier so high as to make it virtually impossible to bring a public in-
terest lawsuit to challenge secret government surveillance pro-
grams.303  Legal scholars have criticized the Court’s “certainly impend-
ing” requirement304 as well as its cramped conception of “injury,” 
arguing that covert surveillance results in numerous harms both to 
individuals and to society that should be recognized as such in stand-
ing doctrine.305  And while the Court’s decision did not entirely close 
the courthouse door with respect to the constitutionality of the Sec-
tion 702 program thanks to FISA’s defendant-notification provision, 
 
300 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
301 Id. at 1158–59. 
302 Id. at 1165. 
303 See, e.g., Editorial, Unbridled Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A24 (calling the decision 
a “clear-cut abdication of its fundamental role in the American constitutional system of 
checks and balances”); Jonathan Turley, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to Secret Surveillance, 
RES IPSA LOQUITUR (Feb. 27, 2013), http://jonathanturley.org/2013/02/27/supreme-
court-rejects-challenge-to-secret-surveillance/ (describing decision as “a true nightmare 
for civil liberties”). 
304 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts:  Triple Error Decisions in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 127, 144–46 (2014) (suggesting that the Court follow the lead of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights to hold that individuals may challenge covert surveillance if 
they can show a “reasonable likelihood” of having been subject to surveillance or that 
they are members of a group that is “at risk” of being surveilled); Slobogin, supra note 38, 
at 520 (arguing that “any litigant whose participation in the political process is concretely 
affected by covert surveillance should have standing” to challenge that surveillance). 
305 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 304, at 134–35 (contending that by denying justiciability in 
Clapper, the Court potentially harmed millions of Americans’ privacy rights, created an 
incentive for unlawful leaks of classified information, impaired democratic self-
governance, and damaged the Court’s role in our constitutional system); Kaminski & 
Witnov, supra note 216, at 514–15 (suggesting that surveillance creates a “conforming ef-
fect” that should be considered as an injury for the purposes of standing); Richards, supra 
note 23, at 1936 (arguing that  standing doctrine should recognize that surveillance 
“menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimi-
nation”); Slobogin, supra note 38, at 519–20 (asserting that covert government surveil-
lance harms the political process). 
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no comparable notice requirement applies to evidence derived from 
an EO 12333 intercept.306 
Unchecked executive branch surveillance power presents serious 
risks to privacy, speech and our democratic processes.  Left unre-
strained, the government’s exercise of that surveillance power is likely 
to continue to expand.  If the judicial branch is to play its constitu-
tionally mandated role in our political system, persons with non-
frivolous claims of objectively reasonable harm stemming from credi-
ble constitutional violations should not be barred from seeking judi-
cial redress, especially when the claims relate to a topic as vital to our 
free society as covert government surveillance.  Accordingly, the 
Court should abandon Clapper’s overly narrow conception of stand-
ing, and allow putative plaintiffs to pursue their claims as long as they 
can demonstrate an objectively reasonable likelihood of injury from 
the chilling effects of government surveillance.  However, while Clap-
per remains the controlling precedent, it will impose a near-
insurmountable threshold requirement for law-abiding Americans to 
challenge secret government surveillance programs based on the 
First or Fourth Amendments. 
IV.  AT THE CONVERGENCE OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH 
So far, this Article has looked at bulk government collection and 
analysis of domestic communications metadata from two isolated per-
spectives.  Part II showed how, under the Fourth Amendment, the 
third party doctrine holds that Americans have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the transactional data relating to their communi-
cations, including the phone numbers or addresses (physical or 
email) with which they correspond.  With respect to the First 
Amendment, Part III demonstrated that, under relevant caselaw, gov-
ernment surveillance programs that neither prohibit nor punish 
speech, nor target the communications of any particular group, are 
unlikely to present a cognizable, invidious chilling effect on speech 
or association.  As the crowning blow, the Court narrowed the rules 
of standing in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA307 to make it almost 
 
306 See Charlie Savage, Reagan-Era Order on Surveillance Violates Rights, Says Departing Aide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2014, at A12, A14 (citing assertions by government officials that criminal 
defendants are not entitled to notice if surveillance conducted under EO 12333 leads to 
evidence used against them). 
307 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (requiring that plaintiffs establish that their “injury based on 
potential future surveillance is certainly impending or is fairly traceable to [Section 
702]”).  See supra notes 286–306 and accompanying text. 
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impossible for a First or Fourth Amendment challenge to a covert 
government surveillance program to be heard in court at all. 
Given our much-vaunted constitutional rights of privacy and free 
expression, how can this be the right result?  Putting the standing 
question to one side, are the protections of the First and Fourth 
Amendments really so tepid that the government can accidentally-on-
purpose gather and scrutinize enormous quantities of our so-called 
“foreign” communications records in an unlimited fashion and with 
impunity?  Surely the serious risks to privacy, as well as the grave dan-
gers of official abuse, presented when the government accumulates 
its citizens’ communication records for future analysis deserve more 
searching Fourth Amendment consideration than perfunctory dis-
missal under the third party doctrine.308  By the same token, it is be-
yond dispute that citizens in a democracy need secure, private meth-
ods of communication to facilitate both personal and political 
expression and association, as well as to ensure the proper function-
ing of both a free press and a representative government.  Govern-
ment collection and analysis of what are essentially domestic commu-
nication records, therefore, implicates our rights to self-government, 
conversational privacy, personal and political association, autonomy 
and basic liberty—all First Amendment interests that should be rec-
ognized in determining the constitutionality of an official surveil-
lance regime309—even if those communications traveled through a 
foreign cable or happen to be stored on an extraterritorial back-up 
server. 
 
308 This constitutional insufficiency has, of course, been observed by others. See, e.g., Jed 
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the third 
party doctrine would allow the government to deploy secret, undercover spies to record 
all of our public acts and conversations, a “totalitarian form of surveillance deeply anti-
thetical to the freedom from state scrutiny of our personal lives for which the Fourth 
Amendment stands”). 
309 Almost fifty years ago, and a generation before the invention of modern surveillance 
technology, Justice William O. Douglas recognized the First Amendment implications of 
government surveillance: 
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are being record-
ed for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his most secret 
thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government; when the most 
confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying ears.  
When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone.  If a man’s privacy 
can be invaded at will, who can say he is free?  If his every word is taken down and 
evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can say he enjoys freedom of 
speech?  If his every association is known and recorded, if the conversations with 
his associates are purloined, who can say he enjoys freedom of association?  When 
such conditions obtain, our citizens will be afraid to utter any but the safest and 
most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with any but the most acceptable peo-
ple.  Freedom as the Constitution envisages it will have vanished. 
  Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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In this Part, I contend that the First Amendment value of com-
munications privacy must be factored into the determination of 
whether a government surveillance program violates the Fourth 
Amendment.310  When considered in tandem this way, the two 
Amendments mutually reinforce each other and create a synergy that 
extends the protections of each.311  This is more than mere constitu-
tional theory; the Supreme Court has taken this exact approach with 
respect to domestic security surveillance in the landmark 1972 case of 
United States v. U.S. District Court (the Keith case).312  There, the Court 
incorporated First Amendment values into its Fourth Amendment 
analysis to hold that electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens who had 
no relation to foreign terrorism was unreasonable without a warrant.  
Keith provides the appropriate method of analysis/precedent for the 
Court to reconsider and limit the third party doctrine in the context 
of bulk government collection of communications metadata.  The 
question then becomes how both Fourth and First Amendment con-
siderations, as well as the undisputedly essential need to keep our na-
tion safe from foreign terrorism, can be accommodated in the im-
plementation of government surveillance programs that incidentally 
sweep in records of U.S. person communications. 
A.  “Scrupulous Exactitude” 
Both courts and commentators have often noted the strong histor-
ical connection between the First and the Fourth Amendments.313  In 
the words of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., “[t]he Bill of Rights was 
fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted 
power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling 
liberty of expression.”314  From its inception, the Fourth Amendment 
was designed to protect the First Amendment values of free speech 
 
310 Professor Akhil Reed Amar urged this approach to the Fourth Amendment more than 
twenty years ago, long before the Snowden era of NSA surveillance.  See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 805 (1994) (“In thinking about 
the broad command of the Fourth Amendment, we must examine other parts of the Bill 
of Rights to identify constitutional values that are elements of constitutional reasonable-
ness.”). 
311 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a 
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”). 
312 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
313 See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (stating that the history of the Fourth 
Amendment “is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the press”); see also 
Solove, supra note 193, at 133 (“The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments share a com-
mon background in concerns about seditious libel.”). 
314 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961). 
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and press from government abuse of its investigative powers.  That 
the interplay between privacy and speech should make a difference in 
the strength of Fourth Amendment protections has been recognized 
by the Court, starting in a series of cases dealing with government sei-
zures of books and films alleged to be obscene.  In these cases, the 
Court invalidated large-scale seizures of multiple copies of magazines 
and books, even though authorities had valid search warrants that 
would have satisfied the Fourth Amendment in another context.315  
Because even obscene publications enjoy presumptive First Amend-
ment protection, the Court found that pretrial seizures of those ma-
terials require pre-seizure procedures “designed to focus searchingly 
on the question of obscenity.”316 
The presence of First Amendment values has also caused the 
Court to interpret Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions more nar-
rowly.  In Roaden v. Kentucky,317 a local sheriff viewed a movie at a 
drive-in theater, determined that it was obscene, arrested the theater 
manager in the projection booth for displaying obscenity, and re-
moved one copy of the film as evidence.318  While the lower court up-
held the seizure as incident to a lawful arrest, a standard warrant ex-
ception,319 the Supreme Court reversed, warning that the Fourth 
Amendment “must not be read in a vacuum.”320  Seizures of weapons 
or contraband must be differentiated, the Court said, from seizures of 
books or films, where First Amendment values are also in play.  “The 
setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each presump-
tively under the protection of the First Amendment,” Chief Justice 
Burger wrote for the Court, “invokes such Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirements because we examine what is ‘unreasonable’ in the 
light of the values of freedom of expression.”321  Roaden stands for the 
proposition that Fourth Amendment reasonableness must be rede-
fined pursuant to stricter standards when First Amendment interests 
are implicated by the search or seizure in question.322 
 
315 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus, 367 U.S. at 738. 
316 Marcus, 367 U.S. at 732; see also Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 210–11 (quoting Marcus, 367 
U.S. at 732). 
317 413 U.S. 496 (1973). 
318 Id. at 497–98. 
319 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (explaining that when an ar-
rest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person of the arrestee 
for weapons and/or evidence, along with the area “within his immediate control” without 
a search warrant). 
320 Roaden, 413 U.S. at 501. 
321 Id. at 504. 
322 Id. 
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Yet in a case that presented a paradigmatic example of a conflict 
between the state and the press, the Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Dai-
ly323 paid mere lip service to its “scrupulous exactitude” formulation to 
approve an innocent third-party search of a newsroom.  In that case, 
Stanford’s student newspaper had published articles and photo-
graphs about a student demonstration in which police officers had 
been hurt.  Suspecting that the newspaper’s files might contain addi-
tional photographs of the melee that would help identify the assail-
ants, police obtained an ex parte warrant and searched the newspa-
per’s offices.324  Outraged that the police had used a knock-on-the-
door search rather than a subpoena duces tecum to obtain any relevant 
photographs (of which there were none), the newspaper and its staff 
brought a civil rights suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, argu-
ing that the search violated their rights under the First and Fourth 
Amendment.325 
After citing the obscenity cases for the idea that “unrestricted 
power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling 
liberty of expression,”326 the Court then failed to heed its own admon-
ition.  Here, the fact that this was a newsroom seemed to add nothing 
to the Court’s Fourth Amendment calculus, despite the newspaper’s 
argument that the search would disrupt its operations, threaten its 
ability to protect confidential sources, and chill its newsgathering ac-
tivities and editorial deliberations.327  All of these interests had been 
adequately protected, according to the Court, by the issuance of a 
warrant.328  The Court’s approach, in effect, removed all substance 
from the “scrupulous exactitude” language; it requires courts to do 
no more than what the Fourth Amendment already obligates them to 
do in any case involving a search or seizure. 
The Court went wrong in Zurcher by refusing to apply the analysis 
it had commanded it Roaden; it failed to determine what was reasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment “in the light of the values of free-
dom of expression.”  By placing too much emphasis on the fact that 
“[i]n the normal course of events, search warrants are more difficult 
to obtain than subpoenas,329 the Court assumed that the warrant re-
 
323 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
324 Id. at 550–51. 
325 Id. at 550–52. 
326 Id. at 564 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961)). 
327 Id. at 563–64. 
328 Id. at 565. 
329  Id. at 562–63. 
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quirement provides the highest level of constitutionally mandated 
privacy protections in all circumstances.330  But a newsroom search is 
not a normal event, and on these facts, a subpoena would have been 
much more effective at guarding the newspaper’s valid First Amend-
ment concerns.331  In dissent, Justice Stewart catalogued the First 
Amendment values that the Court had ignored, concluding that  
newsroom searches were “wholly inimical to the First Amendment.”332  
The decision unleashed a torrent of criticism from the press,333 com-
mentators,334 legislators335 and various citizens’ groups.336  As a result, 
Congress remedied the Court’s error two years later by passing the 
Privacy Protection Act,337 which prohibits federal, state and local law 
enforcement from searching newsrooms or seizing journalists’ work 
product materials except in certain limited circumstances. 
B.  The Keith Case 
While the Court’s misguided approach in Zurcher demonstrates 
how the Fourth Amendment, when applied alone, can be insufficient 
to protect First Amendment interests, the Court’s decision in United 
 
330 In the words of Professor Amar, Zurcher is an example of the Court in thrall to “Fourth 
Amendment worship of the warrant.”  Amar, supra note 310, at 805. 
331 Had police used a subpoena, a surprise intrusion by law enforcement into a working 
newsroom, as well as the attendant police inspection of confidential files, would have 
been avoided.  Furthermore, a subpoena can be disputed or modified in court on disclo-
sure grounds before compliance, while a search warrant cannot be challenged until after 
it has been executed. 
332 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 573 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
333 See, e.g., James Kilpatrick, High Court and Freedom of the Press, TOLEDO BLADE, June 9, 1978, 
at 16, https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=fxhPAAAAIBAJ&sjid= bAIEAAAAIBAJ
&pg=7002%2C3601292 (describing majority opinion in Zurcher as displaying an “aston-
ishing ignorance of the real-world nature of the news-gathering process”); James Reston, 
A Letter to the Whizzer, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1978, at A23 (suggesting that, under Zurcher, 
President Nixon could have seized the Pentagon Papers and thereby prevented publica-
tion of stories based on those documents). 
334 See, e.g., Charles L. Cantrell, Zurcher:  Third Party Searches and Freedom of the Press, 62 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 35, 36 (1978) (describing the decision as “a very real threat to the 
freedom of the press”). 
335 See, e.g., Richard L. Strout, Press Freedom Vote Sets Stage for Court Reassessment, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1980, at 7 (quoting House Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier that Zurcher 
“swept away 200 years of jurisprudence greatly limiting searches directed against innocent 
third parties”). 
336 See, e.g., Birch Bayh, Police Searches of Innocent Third Parties:  A Congressional Response to 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 6 J. LEGIS. 7, 8 (1979) (describing broad-based support for 
Congressional reform in response to Zurcher ruling). 
337 Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2012)). 
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States v. U.S. District Court (the Keith case)338 exemplifies how the two 
Amendments can and should work together in cases involving the 
First Amendment values associated with conversational privacy and 
government surveillance. 
The Keith case emerged out of the civil unrest of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.339  The story began shortly before midnight on Sep-
tember 29, 1968, when several sticks of dynamite exploded outside a 
Central Intelligence Agency recruitment office in Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan.340  Although no one was hurt, the blast blew a hole in the side-
walk, smashed windows and resulted in thousands of dollars of prop-
erty damage.341  A similar string of bombings had occurred in Detroit, 
and within two weeks, another dynamite bomb went off in Ann Ar-
bor, this time at the University of Michigan’s Institute of Science and 
Technology.342 
About a year later, a federal grand jury indicted three members of 
the White Panther Party, including Lawrence “Pun” Plamondon, for 
destruction of government property in connection with the CIA of-
fice bombing.343  Before trial, the defense filed a motion to compel 
the government to disclose any records of electronic surveillance 
conducted with respect to the defendants.  In response, the govern-
ment filed an affidavit from Attorney General John Mitchell admit-
ting that Plamondon had been overheard by government agents on a 
warrantless wiretap employed to collect intelligence regarding “sub-
versive” domestic organizations deemed to be a threat to the national 
security.344  The government argued that this surveillance, although 
conducted without any prior judicial approval, was nevertheless legal 
pursuant to the President’s power to protect national security.345  
 
338 407 U.S. 297 313–15 (1972).  “Keith” refers to Judge Damon J. Keith, the federal district 
judge who heard the case. 
339 Although the opinion contains scant discussion of the underlying facts, the case present-
ed a fascinating back-story involving a Who’s Who of counterculture heroes and villains.  
For more details regarding the case and its cast of characters, see Samuel C. Damren, The 
Keith Case, 11 CT. LEGACY, at 1 (Historical Soc’y for the U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. 
Mich.) (Nov. 2003), https://members.fbamich.org/Portals/31/Documents/Newsletters/
 200311_Court_Legacy.pdf; Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States 
District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287, 288 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
340 See Christopher Zbrozek, The Bombing of the A2 CIA Office, MICH. DAILY (Oct. 24, 2006), 
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/bombing-a2-cia-office. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. 
343 Morrison, supra note 339, at 291–93.  The White Panthers were a radical activist group 
patterned after the Black Panthers and formed by Plamondon and John Sinclair.  Id. 
344 Keith, 407 U.S. at 300. 
345 Id. at 301. 
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Judge Keith disagreed, holding that the surveillance violated the 
Fourth Amendment and ordering the government to disclose the 
overheard conversations to the defense.346  The government chal-
lenged Judge Keith’s order through a writ of mandamus,347 which 
made Judge Keith the respondent in the appellate courts. 
When the mandamus suit reached the Supreme Court in 1972, it 
presented an issue that the Court specifically had left unaddressed in 
Katz v. United States:  “[w]hether safeguards other than prior authori-
zation by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situa-
tion involving the national security.”348  The Court upheld Judge 
Keith’s order, holding that the government must obtain a warrant be-
fore engaging in domestic national security surveillance.349  Im-
portantly, the Court reached its holding by emphasizing the interplay 
between the Fourth and First Amendments in surveillance cases, not-
ing that while “the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger 
in [national security] cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to consti-
tutionally protected speech.”350 
Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis Powell conceded that, at least 
since the time of the Truman Administration, American Presidents 
had employed electronic surveillance to protect the nation from both 
internal and foreign threats.351  But just because a practice is com-
mon, Justice Powell observed, does not make it desirable.  While elec-
tronic surveillance may at times be necessary to safeguard the public 
interest, Justice Powell perceived the risk to privacy presented by gov-
ernment surveillance as both unsettling and frightening to law-
abiding citizens.352  To protect that privacy, Justice Powell turned to 
the Bill of Rights, noting that constitutional protections do not fall by 
the wayside simply because the government cites national security as 
its reason for engaging in surveillance.  Quite the opposite, in fact—
Justice Powell stressed that national security cases “often reflect a 
convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in 
cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.”353  History teaches that surveillance targets 
are often chosen because of their unorthodox political beliefs; as a 
 
346 Id. 
347 Id. 
348 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).  See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
349 Keith, 407 U.S. at 320. 
350 Id. at 313. 
351 Id. at 310–11. 
352 Id. at 312 (“There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that 
this [surveillance] capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding 
citizens.”). 
353 Id. at 313. 
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result, Justice Powell instructed courts to apply Fourth Amendment 
safeguards with a sharp eye to protecting First Amendment rights: 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an 
unchecked surveillance power.  Nor must the fear of unauthorized offi-
cial eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Gov-
ernment action in private conversation.  For private dissent, no less than 
open public discourse, is essential to our free society.354 
Although the Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose was to pre-
vent unauthorized government intrusions into the home, Justice 
Powell cited Katz to emphasize that the Amendment’s “broader spirit 
now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.”355  To 
the Keith Court, unreasonable surveillance, at least in the context of 
domestic security, meant warrantless surveillance.356  To ensure that 
the constitutional values associated with conversational privacy are 
guaranteed, Justice Powell insisted that the government obtain prior 
judicial authorization before spying on Americans for domestic secu-
rity purposes.357  However, given the practical and policy considera-
tions associated with national security surveillance, Justice Powell 
suggested that Congress could enact special domestic security warrant 
requirements different from those imposed by the federal wiretap 
act.  “Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth 
Amendment,” he wrote, “if they are reasonable both in relation to the 
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the 
protected rights of our citizens.”358 
Finally, the Court stressed that it was expressing no opinion re-
garding whether the President could engage in warrantless electronic 
surveillance with respect to foreign powers or their agents.359  While 
the Court admitted that the distinction between domestic and for-
eign security surveillance might, in other cases, be hard to draw, the 
government here had presented no evidence that a foreign power 
had been directly or indirectly implicated in the CIA bombing.  At-
torney General Mitchell’s affidavit established that Plamondon’s calls 
had been overheard on wiretaps employed to gather intelligence re-
 
354 Id. at 314. 
355 Id. at 313. 
356 The Court’s insistence on a warrant exemplifies what has been described as the “warrant 
preference model of reasonableness”—a view that the modern Court has moved away 
from, at least at times, in favor of a balancing approach.  Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness With 
Teeth:  The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1135 
(2012). 
357 Keith, 407 U.S. at 318.  (“Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-
tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
358 Id. at 322–23. 
359 Id. at 308–09, 321–22. 
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garding threats posed by domestic organizations, a term that the 
Court defined as “a group or organization (whether formally or in-
formally constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and 
which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents 
or agencies.”360  While Plamondon may have been involved in a crim-
inal conspiracy, the government had no reason to suspect him of as-
sociating or collaborating with foreign terrorists. 
Although Keith was decided more than 40 years ago, the opinion 
continues to be the Court’s most significant analysis of the constitu-
tional questions pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance of 
American citizens.  In that regard, Keith teaches at least three im-
portant lessons that remain relevant today.  First, the case reminds us 
that even when government surveillance is justified to protect valid 
national interests, it is properly classified as a necessary evil.  It must 
be used cautiously and sparingly, because “even when employed with 
restraint and under judicial supervision,” surveillance creates anxiety 
and distrust among law-abiding citizens.361  Secret, warrantless surveil-
lance violates our constitutional norms; the Bill of Rights leads us to 
expect that, if we haven’t done anything wrong, the government will 
respect our valued right to conversational privacy. 
Second, Keith establishes that First Amendment interests must be 
both recognized and accorded real weight in determining whether 
government surveillance of domestic communications comports with 
the Fourth Amendment.  In a field like national security where First 
and Fourth Amendment values converge, the Keith case tells courts to 
consider those rights in tandem rather than in isolation.  According 
to Justice Powell, courts must balance the government’s duty to pro-
tect national security against the potential danger surveillance poses 
to both “individual privacy and free expression.”362  Imagine a Venn 
diagram that illustrates overlapping spheres; where First and Fourth 
Amendment forces unite, the protections of both Amendments rein-
force and gain strength from each other. 
The third lesson to take from Keith is that the distinction between 
domestic and foreign security is to be determined not only based on 
the purpose of the surveillance, but also on the characteristics of the 
individuals or groups being surveilled.  Attorney General Mitchell’s 
affidavit established that Plamondon’s calls had been overheard on 
wiretaps employed to gather intelligence regarding threats posed by 
 
360 Id. at 309 n.8. 
361 Id. at 312. 
362 Keith, 407 U.S. at 314–15. 
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domestic organizations; Plamondon himself was not the target.363  A 
member of the defense team later speculated that Plamondon’s calls 
from Algeria, where he was hiding, to the Oakland headquarters of 
the Black Panthers had been captured by an NSA intercept.364  We 
will never know the details, because the government chose to dismiss 
the charges against Plamondon rather than disclose the surveillance 
records.365  My point, however, is simply that foreign collection should 
not change the constitutional analysis when the government takes ad-
vantage of our global communications network to both harvest and 
analyze in bulk, vast amounts of metadata relating to the communica-
tions of U.S. persons who have “no significant connection with a for-
eign power, its agents or agencies.”366 
C.  Applying Keith to Bulk Collection of Domestic Communications Metadata 
Assuming that courts, applying Keith, recognize the synergy of pri-
vacy and speech when determining Fourth Amendment challenges to 
government surveillance programs, what difference would that 
recognition make with respect to the bulk collection of communica-
tions metadata?  Would the First Amendment values associated with 
conversational privacy even come close to changing the Fourth 
Amendment balance of interests when the prevention of terrorist at-
tacks is the government’s countervailing concern?  The answer, as is 
almost always the case with a balancing test, is “It depends.” 
First, consider the government’s argument that the collection and 
later analysis of communications metadata does not rise to the level 
of a Fourth Amendment seizure or search because communicators 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the transactional infor-
mation they share with their telecommunications providers.  This 
claim, based on Smith v. Maryland, was the centerpiece of the gov-
ernment’s constitutional defense of the former Section 215 pro-
gram,367 and, as described in Part I, has been cited by the government 
to justify the NSA’s unlimited contact chaining of domestic metadata 
collected under EO 12333.368 
 
363 Id. at 300 n.2. 
364 See Morrison, supra note 339, at 296. 
365 See Damren, supra note 339, at 8. 
366 Keith, 407 U.S. at 309 n.8.  Of course, Congress recognized this with respect to targeting 
of U.S. persons who are located abroad, which requires a FISA warrant.  However, as ex-
plained in Part I, bulk collections of communications metadata are not covered under 
that provision.  See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
367 See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 19–20. 
368 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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As detailed in Part II, a strong case can be made under the Fourth 
Amendment, considered by itself, that the third party doctrine is both 
outdated and inaccurate with respect to our expectations of privacy 
in the digital age.369  The assumption of the risk rationale on which 
Smith was based was highly questionable in 1979, and later changes in 
technology—which require us to create digital third-party trails to 
send an email, search the Internet, or use our cell phones—have 
eviscerated that rationale entirely.  Justice Marshall’s observation in 
his Smith dissent is even truer today:  “It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’ 
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no real-
istic alternative.”370  Some lower courts have begun to recognize the 
inadequacies of the third party doctrine in the context of cell-site lo-
cation data, holding that government collection of location-tracking 
information for an extended period without a warrant violates cell-
phone users’ reasonable expectations of privacy.371 
This conclusion, that citizens do not expect the government to 
use privately owned cell phones as digital tracking tools, makes good 
sense. It is even more reasonable for citizens to assume that the gov-
ernment will respect their right to conversational and associational 
privacy under the First Amendment.  As shown in Part III, communi-
cations metadata is often just as revealing as the underlying messages 
themselves; studies show that the content/non-content distinction 
does not hold up.372  Email and phone records provide private details 
about conversations and relationships that law-abiding citizens right-
fully consider to be none of the government’s business.373  According 
to the Keith Court, both the public fear of pervasive government sur-
veillance, and the potential for future abuse of collected data, present 
 
369 See supra notes 155–80 and accompanying text. 
370 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
371 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F. 3d 332, 355–61 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g granted en 
banc, No. 12-4825, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19064 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015) (distinguishing 
Smith v. Maryland to hold that law enforcement must procure a warrant to obtain long-
term cell site location records); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provid-
er of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d 
304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that third party doctrine does not apply to cell site 
location information generated by cell phone service providers).  But see United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–12 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 9, 
2015) (applying third party doctrine to hold that cell phone users voluntarily convey cell 
site location information to their service providers); In re Application of U.S. for Histori-
cal Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2013) (same). 
372 See supra notes 204–215 and accompanying text. 
373 See Pew 2014 Study, supra note 1, at 22 (finding that, following the Snowden disclosures, 
close to 80% of Americans agreed or strongly agreed that the nation should be con-
cerned about government monitoring of phone calls and emails). 
882 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
dangers to free expression that deserve weight in the Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  By combining these First and Fourth Amend-
ment interests against the eroding justifications for the third party 
doctrine, the Court should recognize that U.S. persons have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their communications metadata.  
Depending on one’s overall view of the third party doctrine, either a 
benefit or a short-coming of the Keith approach is that it allows the 
Court to limit the third party doctrine in the communications con-
text, without having to discard the doctrine in its entirety. 
Determining that the collection and analysis of communications 
metadata constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, however, does not mean that the government 
surveillance program necessarily is prohibited.  The government will 
argue, as it did in the former Section 215 telephony metadata con-
text,374 that even if the third party doctrine does not apply, the gov-
ernment’s interest in preventing foreign terrorism outweighs any 
minimal privacy interest associated with the collection and analysis of 
incidentally acquired domestic communications metadata under EO 
12333.  While the Keith Court reserved the question of whether the 
warrant clause is subject to a foreign intelligence exception,375 the 
FISA Court of Review in 2008 recognized such an exception and ap-
plied a reasonableness test to reject a telecommunications company’s 
Fourth Amendment challenge to a foreign intercept order.376  Lower 
courts consistently have held that when the government collects in-
formation abroad concerning a U.S. person, a reasonableness test, ra-
ther than the warrant requirement, applies.377  Even in the criminal 
law context, the Court in recent years has moved towards a “reasona-
 
374 See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 21 (“The telephony metadata collection is also 
consistent with the First Amendment” because “the program does not collect the content 
of any communications and . . . the data may be queried only when the Government has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a particular number is associated with a specific 
foreign terrorist organization.”). 
375 407 U.S. 297, 308–09, 321–22 (1972). 
376 In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act, 551 F. 3d 1004, 1011–13  (Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev. 2008). 
377 See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that with re-
spect to extraterritorial search by U.S. agents of U.S. citizen’s home, Fourth Amendment 
requires application of reasonableness test rather than warrant requirement); In re Ter-
rorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding 
that wiretapping and search of U.S. citizen’s home that occurs overseas is governed by 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, not warrant requirement); United States v. 
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying reasonableness test that considered 
U.S. agents’ compliance with foreign law in Fourth Amendment calculation). 
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bleness view” of the Fourth Amendment,378 pursuant to which it looks 
to the totality of the circumstances and balances the legitimate gov-
ernment interests served by the search against the individual interests 
involved.379 
On the government’s side of the ledger, the executive branch ar-
gues that surveillance conducted pursuant to EO 12333 serves the 
undeniably significant interest in the prevention of potentially cata-
strophic terrorist attacks.380  According to the NSA, communications 
metadata collected under EO 12333 help the NSA to “understand 
where to find valid foreign intelligence information needed to pro-
tect U.S. national security interests in a large and complicated global 
network” and to “map communications between terrorists and their 
associates.”381  National security—the same interest that the govern-
ment used to justify surveillance in Keith—and the fight against for-
eign terrorism repeatedly have been described by courts as interests 
of the highest magnitude.382  As a result, the balancing exercise starts 
with a heavy hand on the scale in favor of the government. 
These are the identical concerns, of course, that the government 
used to justify bulk collection of domestic telephony metadata under 
the former Section 215.  Assuming for the sake of argument that col-
lection under the former Section 215 amounted to a Fourth 
Amendment search or seizure, the Obama Administration defended 
the reasonableness of that program not only by reciting the govern-
ment’s weighty interest in terrorism prevention, but also by pointing 
to various privacy safeguards and minimization procedures with 
which the NSA was required to comply.  For example, the govern-
 
378 See Lee, supra note 356, at 1134–35 (contrasting the Court’s former “warrant preference 
view” of the Fourth Amendment with the current “reasonableness view”). 
379 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847–48 (2006) (“‘[U]nder our general Fourth 
Amendment Approach’ we ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine 
whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (alteration in original)); Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reason-
ableness.”); see also Amar, supra note 310, at 759 (“We need to read the [Fourth] 
Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable 
cause, or exclusion of evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be rea-
sonable.”). 
380 See EO 12333, supra note 13, at Preamble. (“Timely, accurate, and insightful information 
about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, 
and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States.”). 
381 See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 3. 
382 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (“Everyone agrees that the 
Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest or-
der.”); In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012 (“[T]he relevant governmental interest—the in-
terest in national security—is of the highest order of magnitude.”). 
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ment emphasized that FISC orders limited the NSA’s ability to query 
or disseminate the collected metadata,383 and the program was subject 
to monitoring by the FISC, Congress, the Department of Justice, and 
the intelligence community.384  Likewise, in upholding bulk telephony 
metadata collection against a Fourth Amendment challenge, a feder-
al district court cited executive, congressional, and FISC oversight as 
evidence of the program’s reasonableness.385  Opponents of the for-
mer Section 215 collection regime naturally disputed the adequacy of 
these safeguards to minimize privacy harms but, sufficient or not, 
they contributed to the overall reasonableness analysis.386 
As described in Part I, when the NSA engages in foreign-based 
electronic surveillance, it incidentally acquires large numbers of U.S. 
person communications, including calls made by Americans to peo-
ple in foreign countries, and communications among Americans that 
happen to transit through international cables, or are stored on 
backup servers located in foreign countries.387  In both the criminal 
law and foreign intelligence contexts, however, the mere fact that 
non-pertinent communications are collected as part of authorized 
surveillance does not make the surveillance unreasonable.388  Rather, 
courts look to the adequacy of minimization procedures whereby the 
government tries to avoid or ameliorate the privacy intrusions associ-
ated with those incidental interceptions.389 
So, for example, in 2014 a federal district court held that warrant-
less surveillance under Section 702 of FISA was reasonable because 
FISA-approved targeting and minimization procedures adequately 
protected the privacy of U.S. persons whose communications were 
 
383 ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 15, 21. 
384 Id. at 4–5. 
385 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 785 
F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015). 
386 For a summary of the objections to the former Section 215 program minimization proce-
dures, see Susan Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide:  Competing Visions of the NSA’s 
215 Program, 12 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 309, 324–25 (2014). 
387 See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text. 
388 See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157–58 (1974) (finding that conversations 
collected between a named party and an unspecific party is allowed); In re Directives 
[Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 
F.3d 1004, 1015 (Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev. 2008) (noting that incidental col-
lections do not render the collection unlawful). 
389 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140–42 (1978) (examining the facts and cir-
cumstances of the wiretap to determine whether the minimization procedure were ade-
quate); In Re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1015 (finding that the minimization procedures were 
adequate). 
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incidentally acquired.390  In conducting the reasonableness analysis, 
the court also emphasized the existence of congressional, as well as 
FISC, oversight of the program based on specific statutory reporting 
requirements.391  The court pointed to procedures limiting the reten-
tion and dissemination of foreign communications of or concerning 
U.S. persons, and requiring that the identity of U.S. persons be delet-
ed in certain circumstances.392 
But minimization procedures that apply to FISA-based surveil-
lance, including the Section 215 domestic telephony metadata collec-
tion program as reconstituted by the Freedom Act, do not apply to 
signals intelligence gathered under EO 12333.393  The NSA’s EO 
12333 surveillance activities are not subject to FISC approval or re-
view, nor has Congress chosen to subject those activities to significant 
legislative oversight.394  And while the Attorney General has approved 
minimization procedures that govern the NSA’s collection, analysis, 
and retention of U.S. person information acquired pursuant to EO 
12333 surveillance, as detailed in Part I, those procedures are much 
less robust with respect to the incidental acquisition, and later analy-
sis, of domestic communications metadata than they are with respect 
to communication content.395  For example, Part I showed how, alt-
hough the Freedom Act limits the NSA’s ability to contact chain Sec-
tion 215 domestic telephony metadata out to two hops, under 
SPCMA, the NSA may contact chain EO 12333-collected metadata 
through U.S. person identifiers in an unlimited manner.  And while 
the Freedom Act requires the NSA to purge metadata determined to 
be irrelevant to foreign intelligence, communication records ob-
tained under EO 12333 may be retained by the government for at 
least five years. 
Another critical factor in determining whether incidental collec-
tion is, in fact, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is its 
scope.396  Enormousness can negate reasonableness.  The FISC rec-
 
390 United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *72–73 
(D. Ore., June 24,2013). 
391 Id. at *63–64. 
392 Id. at *65–66. 
393 See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2 (“Collection pursuant to EO 12333 is conduct-
ed through various means around the globe, largely from outside the United States, 
which is not otherwise regulated by FISA.”). 
394 See Watkins, supra note 74 (quoting head of the Senate Intelligence Committee as saying 
that Congress does not “sufficiently” oversee EO 12333 surveillance because it falls under 
executive authority). 
395 See supra notes 89–110 and accompanying text. 
396 See e.g., PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 93, at 96 (stating that the scope of the in-
cidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications under Section 702 of FISA “raise 
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ognized this in 2011, when Judge John D. Bates refused to reapprove 
NSA targeting and minimization procedures with respect to targeted 
acquisition of foreign Internet communications pursuant to Section 
702 of FISA.397  The government had informed Judge Bates that, be-
cause of “technological challenges,”398 the NSA had and would con-
tinue incidentally to acquire tens of thousands of wholly domestic 
emails that had been routed internationally and that had no direct 
connection to the surveillance target.399  Judge Bates ordered the NSA 
to stop email collection until the process could be better tailored to 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement,400 stat-
ing that “[t]here surely are circumstances in which incidental intru-
sions can be so substantial as to render a search or seizure unreason-
able.”401 
How much metadata relating to the communications of U.S. per-
sons who have “no significant connection with a foreign power, its 
agents or agencies”402 does the NSA collect pursuant to its authority 
under EO 12333?  The NSA isn’t telling, but press reports indicate 
the scope of collection is massive.  For example, in 2013 the Washing-
ton Post reported that under EO 12333, the NSA collects “hundreds of 
millions” of email address books and instant-messaging “buddy lists” 
belonging to people around the world, including many Americans, as 
that data travels over international data routes.403  Although two un-
named intelligence officials declined to estimate how many Ameri-
cans’ contact lists were swept up in the dragnet, they “did not dispute 
that the number is likely to be in the millions or tens of millions.”404  
As Alvaro Bedoya noted on the Just Security blog, the volume of inci-
dental collection of U.S. person communications under EO 12333 
 
questions about whether its impact on U.S. persons pushes the program over the edge in-
to constitutional unreasonableness”); Alvaro Bedoya, Executive Order 12333 and the Golden 
Number, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:14 AM) (examining the reasonableness standard 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
397 FISC Memorandum Opinion (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.), http://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinion-and%20Order-20140716.pdf. 
398 Id. at 30. 
399 Id. at 72. 
400 Id. at 78–79. 
401 Id. at 75. 
402 Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8 (1972). 
403 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-
80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html. 
404 Id. 
Feb. 2016] SYNERGY OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH 887 
 
appears to be much larger than the mere tens of thousands of U.S. 
email communications that concerned Judge Bates.405 
The scope of incidental collection of American communications 
metadata under EO 12333 is also vital from a speech perspective.  
There is enormous First Amendment value in ensuring that major 
American communications systems—including telephone companies 
and Internet service providers—are not co-opted, infiltrated, or in-
fected by the government in a way that threatens the sanctity of our 
citizens’ communications.406  Free speech and a free press are requi-
site components of a democratic system, and the existence of an “in-
frastructure of free expression”407 creates the public trust needed for 
a democracy to function.  That trust has been shaken by the Snowden 
revelations; it could be destroyed if citizens realize that, thanks to 
government overreaching under EO 12333, the Freedom Act’s touted 
surveillance reforms are more illusory than real.408  While whistle-
blower John Napier Tye409 may have had only limited success so far at 
bringing EO 12333 to the attention of ordinary Americans, for all we 
know, the next Edward Snowden could be waiting in the wings. 
Finally, any evaluation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
must also include a cost-benefit analysis.  Privacy and speech concerns 
associated with pervasive government surveillance can only be out-
weighed by legitimate national security interests if, in fact, the pro-
gram has value in the fight against terrorism.  For this reason, after 
concluding that the former Section 215 program had not prevented 
any terrorist attacks,410 the PCLOB called for a halt, and the Presi-
 
405 See Bedoya, supra note 396 (noting that the number of emails collected outnumber the 
tens of thousands that worried Judge Bates). 
406 Documents leaked by Edward Snowden continue to reveal how the government has part-
nered with telecommunication companies to implement mass surveillance programs.  For 
example, in August 2015, the New York Times and ProPublica reported that AT&T provided 
the NSA with access to billions of telephone and email records from 2001 to 2013.  Julia 
Angwin, et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2015, 
at A1. 
407 See Balkin, supra note 122, at 4 (describing the role of data processing systems in distrib-
uting the benefits of modern citizenship). 
408 See Pew 2014 Study, supra note 1, at 23–25 (concluding that, following the Snowden dis-
closures, most Americans felt insecure sharing private information over landline phones, 
cell phones, email and social media.).  The same study found that only 18% of American 
adults said they expect the federal government to do “the right thing” all or most of the 
time, and close to 80% agreed or strongly agreed that the nation should be concerned 
about government monitoring of phone calls and emails.  Id. at 22, 28. 
409 See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
410 See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 11 (“Based on the information provided 
to the Board, including classified briefings and documentation, we have not identified a 
single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the program made a con-
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dent’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technol-
ogy (“PRG”) recommended significant reforms, to the former Sec-
tion 215 telephony metadata collection program.411  We can assume 
that overseas surveillance conducted under EO 12333 has provided 
the intelligence community with essential information over the years 
with respect to national security.  However, the relevant inquiry here 
is whether the government’s use of international methods to inci-
dentally collect and analyze metadata associated with Americans’ es-
sentially domestic communications is justified in the fight against ter-
rorism.  Could the government use technology to limit its intake of 
American communications records under EO 12333 such that the 
program would still be effective?  Does the NSA intentionally drive 
domestic Internet communications through international transit 
routes so as to collect it under EO 12333?  Has the NSA thwarted any 
terrorist plots as a result of allowing enhanced analysis of U.S. person 
communications metadata under SPCMA?  Given the secrecy sur-
rounding EO 12333, we just don’t know. 
D.  A Way Forward 
Until the Supreme Court loosens the overly rigid standing re-
quirements it adopted in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,412 a con-
stitutional challenge to incidental collection of domestic communica-
tion records under EO 12333 is a virtual impossibility.413  
Nevertheless, given the important First and Fourth Amendment in-
terests upon which such surveillance intrudes, both Congress and the 
executive branch can and should take steps to provide meaningful 
privacy protections with respect to EO 12333 collection and analysis 
of the communications records of U.S. persons.  Below, I have listed 
some suggestions. 
1.  The public and Congress need more information regarding the scope of 
NSA surveillance conducted under EO 12333.  The Snowden leaks trig-
 
crete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.”); PRG Report, supra 
note 85, at 104 (“Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist inves-
tigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing at-
tacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional sec-
tion 215 orders.”). 
411 See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 168 (recommending to stop the Section 
215 bulk telephone records program); PRG Report, supra note 85, at 115–29 (recom-
mending several modifications to the Section 215 program such as changing the storage 
of the data from the government to a private third party). 
412 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
413 See supra notes 357–71 and accompanying text. 
Feb. 2016] SYNERGY OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH 889 
 
gered both official inquiries and public debate regarding the NSA’s 
collection of bulk domestic telephony metadata under the former 
Section 215.  As a result, Congress stepped in and, with the Freedom 
Act, imposed some important limits on that program.  The democrat-
ic process worked.  An unfortunate side effect of the Freedom Act, 
however, is that many Americans now believe—incorrectly—that their 
communications metadata are no longer being collected in bulk, 
held and analyzed by the NSA.  Even worse, members of Congress 
similarly may be in the dark, given the pervasive secrecy surrounding 
the scope of incidental collections of American communications rec-
ords under EO 12333.  To the extent that national security allows, 
Congress and the American people need sufficient information re-
garding the scope and efficacy of metadata collection and analysis 
conducted under EO 12333 to determine whether the accompanying 
burden on our constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties is, in fact, 
justified. 
As a possible first step, the PCLOB in 2014 announced its inten-
tion to examine two counterterrorism-related intelligence community 
activities governed by EO 12333.  Its goal was to provide, by the end 
of 2015, two written, classified reports assessing the balance between 
each of those activities and privacy, as well as possible recommenda-
tions to enhance civil liberties.414  Additionally, the PCLOB said it in-
tends to release a public report explaining how the government uses 
EO 12333 and its implementing procedures to collect, retain, and 
disseminate information about U.S. persons.415  It is, of course, impos-
sible to know how much useful data the public report will present, or 
how receptive the executive branch will be to any reform suggestions 
contained in the classified reports.  In 2013, the White House refused 
to adopt a PRG recommendation meant to apply to EO 12333 activi-
ties, stating that to do so would require “significant changes” to regu-
lar EO 12333 procedures.416 
Another question that needs answering is the extent to which 
Congress and its relevant subcommittees are briefed regarding sur-
veillance activities under EO 12333.  Senator Dianne Feinstein, for-
 
414 See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., PCLOB EXAMINATION OF E.O. 12333 
ACTIVITIES IN 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.pclob.gov/library/20150408-
EO12333_Project_Description.pdf (describing the Board’s intended process for review-
ing two counterterrorism related activities governed by EO 12333). 
415 Id. 
416 See Tye, supra note 111 (explaining that Recommendation 12 of the PRG Report was un-
derstood by the White House to be intended to apply to EO 12333, and that the President 
had no plans to implement the recommendation). 
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mer chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has said that the 
committee has not exercised “sufficient” oversight of those activi-
ties.417  Accordingly, as it did with the Church Committee in the 
1970s, Congress should hold hearings or otherwise investigate the 
scope of the NSA’s incidental collection of domestic communications 
under EO 12333.  If the Freedom Act is actually a “huge nothing-
burger”418 for the privacy community, both Congressional leaders and 
the American people are entitled to know it. 
2.  Congress must enact further surveillance reforms.  Certainly Con-
gress has the power and the duty not only to investigate the extent of 
intelligence agencies’ surveillance activities, but also to propose, en-
act, and update limits on those activities, as exemplified by passage of 
the original FISA as well as the Freedom Act.419  However, restrictions 
placed by the Freedom Act on the NSA’s ability to collect, analyze, 
and retain domestic communications metadata are meaningless if the 
NSA can conduct virtually the same activities under EO 12333.  Ac-
cordingly, Congress should, to the extent possible, subject NSA 
metadata collection and analysis under EO 12333 to comparable lim-
its imposed by the Freedom Act.  In particular, given that the NSA 
under SPCMA can analyze metadata without establishing a reasona-
ble, articulable suspicion that a particular phone number or email 
address is associated with international terrorism,420 Congress should 
forbid the NSA from contact chaining through U.S. identifiers.  The 
NSA should also be required promptly to destroy all domestic com-
munication records determined to be irrelevant to foreign intelli-
gence.  Additionally, Congress should force the NSA to provide no-
tice to criminal defendants when evidence to be used in court against 
them has been derived from EO 12333 surveillance, as it must with 
respect to surveillance under Section 702 of FISA.421  Finally, Congress 
should also mandate that the Director of National Intelligence pro-
 
417 See Watkins, supra note 74 (detailing the expansion of NSA authority under EO 12333). 
418 See Harris, supra note 71 (explaining that the Freedom Act, by forcing phone companies 
to hold on to records, does not suspend the NSA’s record program). 
419 In 2014, Congress set limits on how long intelligence agencies can retain data collected 
under EO 12333.  See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-
293, § 309, 128 Stat. 3990 (2014) (listing limitations on data retention). Following the 
Act’s passage, Sen. Ron Wyden indicated that although those limits did not meaningfully 
restrict the NSA, the Act nevertheless created a precedent for Congress to impose a legis-
lative framework on EO 12333 surveillance activities. See Ellen Nakashima, Congress Sets 
Limits on Overseas Data Collection, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/congress-sets-limits-on-overseas-data-
collection/2014/12/17/82972c6e-8558-11e4-a702-fa31ff4ae98e_story.html. 
420 See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
421 See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
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vide an annual report to Congress—classified in whole or part, as 
necessary—regarding surveillance activities conducted under EO 
12333, including a good faith estimate of the scope of NSA incidental 
collection of American communications. 
3.  The President should amend EO 12333 to reflect modern communica-
tions technology.  EO 12333 was adopted in 1981, before development 
of the Internet and global telecommunications networks made na-
tional borders irrelevant with respect to Americans’ ability to com-
municate.  EO 12333 needs to be updated to reflect these new tech-
nologies, and to acknowledge that domestic communications do not 
lose their constitutional protections because they happen to be stored 
on a backup server located in a foreign country, or flow through an 
international cable on their way across town.  In this regard, Presi-
dential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28), which indicates that “signals in-
telligence shall be as tailored as feasible,”422 may be a step on the path 
to reform.  Section one, “Principles Governing the Collection of Sig-
nals Intelligence,” states as follows: 
Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning 
of U.S. signals intelligence activities. The United States shall not collect 
signals intelligence for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism 
or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, 
gender, sexual orientation, or religion.”423 
Recall from Part I, however, that the NSA’s definition of “collect” 
does not include contact chaining and other analysis of metadata.424  
And it is unclear how PPD-28 relates to EO 12333, given that a later 
footnote states that “this directive is not intended to alter the rules 
applicable to U.S. persons in Executive Order 12333.”425  Again, more 
information is needed to clarify whether and how PPD-28 applies to 
the collection and analysis of U.S. person communications metadata 
under EO 12333. 
4.  The Attorney General should reject SCPMA.  Regardless of whether 
Congress enacts statutory limitations, the Attorney General should re-
turn the NSA to pre-SCPMA guidelines regarding the analysis of U.S. 
person communications metadata gathered under EO 12333.  As de-
scribed in Part I, prior to 2010, NSA analysts stopped contact chain-
ing communications metadata when they encountered a U.S. person 
phone number or email address.426  The Attorney General approved 
 
422 PPD-28, supra note 79, at § 1(d). 
423 Id. at § 1(b). 
424 See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
425 PPD-28, supra note 79, at § 4(a) n.9. 
426 See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
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SPCMA based on the argument that U.S. persons have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in communications metadata because of the 
third party doctrine427—a position that is outdated and inaccurate, 
especially when considered in light both the First and Fourth 
Amendment values associated with conversational privacy.  Unless the 
NSA can demonstrate that unlimited contact chaining and other 
augmented analysis of U.S. persons’ communications metadata has 
been instrumental in the nation’s fight against terrorism, SPCMA will 
fail a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that properly in-
cludes First Amendment interests in the balance. 
5.  The President should name a civilian to head the NSA.  In its report 
on surveillance, the PRG suggested that greater civilian control of the 
NSA could increase its sensitivity to the privacy concerns of ordinary 
Americans.428  It surmised that decisions regarding surveillance for 
counterterrorism purposes could be overly influenced by the combat 
needs of the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially considering 
that today, the same digital devices, operating systems, applications, 
routers, and fiber optic cables are used for both civilian and military 
communications.429  While during military operations, surveillance di-
rected towards our enemies must be “highly aggressive and largely 
unrestrained,” the PRG noted that at home, the government must 
take care not to undermine communications privacy.430  It recom-
mended that the NSA director should be a Senate-confirmed posi-
tion, and that the President should “give serious consideration” to 
appointing a civilian as the next NSA Director,431 which would neces-
sitate splitting off the U.S. Cyber Command military unit from the 
NSA—another one of the PRG’s recommendations.432 
Although the President reportedly had his staff draft a list of pos-
sible civilian candidates for the post when General Keith Alexander 
stepped down in 2014, the President ultimately appointed another 
military officer to lead the agency.433  While I have no reason to doubt 
the qualifications or ability of Admiral Michael Rogers, it is telling 
that the New York Times immediately noted he had “no public track 
record in addressing the kind of privacy concerns that have put the 
 
427 Id. 
428 PRG Report, supra note 85, at 179–83. 
429 Id. at 185–87. 
430 Id. at 186–87. 
431 Id. at 188. 
432 Id. at 190. 
433 David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Choice Is Expert on Cyberwar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/world/vice-admiral-to-be-named-nsa-
director.html?_r=0. 
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agency under a harsh spotlight.”434  The idea that the government 
should develop different surveillance policies for military versus non-
combat operations is worth future consideration.  In that regard, the 
next head of the NSA should be a civilian who is subject to a Senate 
confirmation hearing where he or she must respond to elected repre-
sentatives’ concerns regarding agency overreach and the intrusions 
on privacy that accompany pervasive surveillance programs.  This 
would both increase agency accountability, and help rebuild public 
trust in an agency thought by many to have drastically overstepped its 
bounds in the name of national security. 
CONCLUSION 
While no one can dispute the intelligence community’s legitimate 
need to protect our nation, we must not forget Justice Powell’s ad-
monition that even when used sparingly, surveillance threatens our 
civil liberties and causes law-abiding citizens to distrust their govern-
ment.435  As technology evolves and our society becomes ever more 
dependent on digital devices, we can expect that massive government 
surveillance programs will continue to proliferate.  If the govern-
ment’s surveillance power is left unchecked, we risk finding ourselves 
living in a world sociologists describe as the “surveillant assemblage,” 
where law-abiding citizens who, in earlier times, were never the target 
of government surveillance, have become subject to routine monitor-
ing.436  The implications with respect to privacy, creativity, dissent, 
personal and political association, as well as the operation of a free 
press and our democratic processes, are enormous. 
With the passage of the Freedom Act, Congress supposedly 
curbed the NSA’s ability to spy on ordinary Americans by taking the 
agency out of the domestic metadata collection business entirely.  In 
truth, however, the new law did nothing to limit the NSA’s ability to 
capitalize on the global nature of modern communications networks 
to collect and analyze most of those same records in bulk under EO 
12333.  Both Congress and the public need more information about 
how, under EO 12333, the NSA scoops up and analyzes phone, email, 
and other communication records belonging not only to foreign ter-
 
434 Id. 
435 United States v. U.S District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).  See supra note 352 and ac-
companying text. 
436 See Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. OF 
SOCIOL. 605, 606 (2000) (describing how a “surveillant assemblage” transforms the pur-
poses of surveillance to encompass individuals who formerly were not subjected to it). 
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rorists, but also to innocent Americans.  Additionally, Congress 
should act to ensure that the intelligence community cannot use EO 
12333 to evade statutory and constitutional protections by capturing 
Americans’ communications from foreign sources. 
Additional statutory and executive branch reforms are essential, 
given that under current Court precedent, a constitutional challenge 
to incidental collection of domestic communications metadata under 
EO 12333 might well fail.  Even assuming that a litigant could over-
come the near-insurmountable obstacles to standing imposed by 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,437 courts in Fourth Amendment 
cases have applied the third party doctrine to hold that Americans 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications 
metadata.  Alternatively, under First Amendment case law, govern-
ment surveillance programs that do not target any particular group, 
or prohibit or punish speech, are unlikely to be seen as presenting an 
actionable chilling effect on speech or association. 
My central theme has been that the First Amendment, when con-
sidered in partnership with the Fourth, can and should play a role in 
protecting us against becoming the surveillant assemblage.  Both 
courts and the executive branch should avoid viewing the Bill of 
Rights as merely creating narrow, isolated zones of protection for our 
rights of privacy and speech.  The risk with such an overly insular 
analysis, of course, is that a governmental activity that straddles the 
two constitutional provisions may simply fall into the resulting black 
hole between the constitutional guarantees.  A better approach in 
addressing the momentous speech and communications privacy is-
sues associated with bulk government surveillance programs would be 
to read the provisions of the First Amendment together with those of 
the Fourth.  The First Amendment value of communications privacy 
must be factored into the determination of whether a government 
surveillance program violates the Fourth Amendment.  As the Court 
demonstrated in the Keith case, when the two Amendments are taken 
in tandem, as pieces of the same cloth, they create a force field that 
extends the protections of each. 
 
437 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).  See infra notes 286–307 and accompanying text. 
